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Abstract
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1 Introduction
There has recently been a revival of interest among policy makers in the fiscal policy tool.
The fiscal transmission mechanism has also attracted considerable attention in the academic
literature. A number of papers have explored the ability of quantitative business cycle
models, of both the neoclassical and the new Keynesian variety to account for the data,
see e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher [2004], and Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles [2007],
respectively.1 However, most analyses have been confined to closed economy models and
to one-sector frameworks. In the present paper we instead address the following question:
to what extent can an open economy version of the two-sector neoclassical model account
for the evidence on the fiscal policy transmission mechanism?
Several empirical studies have explored open economy aspects of the fiscal transmission
mechanism. One of the most prominent and consistent set of empirical findings that emerges
is that a rise in public spending produces a contained increase in GDP, a simultaneous
decline in investment and the current account, and most importantly, depreciates the real
exchange rate, see e.g. Corsetti et al. [2012], Enders et al. [2011], Monacelli and Perotti
[2010].2 Monacelli and Perotti [2010] show that a New Keynesian model can account for
these findings, notably the fall in domestic prices relative to foreign prices, as long as
preferences are non separable between consumption and leisure.3 One major contribution
of our paper is to show that the neoclassical model can account for the real exchange rate
depreciation along with the simultaneous decline in investment and the current account,
once we allow for endogenous markups and the traded sector is assumed to more capital
intensive.4 Our analysis complements Monacelli and Perotti’s [2010] study by showing
1Hall [2009] compares the predictions of the neoclassical model with those derived from a new Keynesian
framework.
2Corsetti et al. [2012] use a sample of 17 OECD countries over the period 1975-2008 while Monacelli and
Perotti [2010] consider a sample of four countries (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States) over
the period running from 1980:1 to 2006:4. Monacelli and Perotti [2010] find a real exchange rate depreciation
for Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Enders et al. [2011] corroborate this conclusion
for the US while Corsetti et al. [2012] confirm this finding for countries with floating exchange rate regimes.
3The intuition behind Monacelli and Perotti’s [2010] result is as follows. The authors assume that prices
are sticky so that a rise in government spending induces a shift in the labor demand curve because firms have
to adjust quantities in face of a demand increase. As a result, the real wage rises. Because the authors allow
for non separability in preferences between consumption and leisure, consumption is increasing with the
wage rate, although under certain conditions. Under complete markets, consumption risk-sharing implies
that the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption are tied to the real exchange rate. By reducing the
marginal utility, the rise in consumption produces a fall in domestic prices relative to foreign prices.
4We follow Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] in allowing for the markup to be endogenous. This setup
is a multi-sector extension of Linnemann’s [2001] model of an endogenous markup. Considering that only
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that the combined effect of counter-cyclical markups and inputs reallocation across sectors
generates a real exchange rate depreciation after a temporary fiscal expansion in a model
with flexible prices, albeit under certain conditions.
Intuitively, whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non
traded sector, resources are shifted toward the non traded sector because public purchases
disproportionately benefit this sector.5 As the rise in government spending boosts non-
traded output, profit opportunities trigger the entry of new firms.6 Hence, the markup
falls, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. Because producers with market power mark
up prices over the unit cost, the real exchange rate depreciates if both the markup and the
unit cost fall or the decline in the markup more than offsets the rise in the unit cost. The
change in the unit cost crucially depends on sectoral capital-labor ratio adjustments.7 When
the traded sector is more capital intensive, for a given real exchange rate, the reallocation
of inputs keeps sectoral capital-labor ratios fixed so that the unit cost is unaffected. More
precisely, a temporary increase in government spending, by implying a rise in future taxes
(that we assume to be lump-sum), induces Ricardian agents to increase labor supply which
drives down sectoral capital-labor ratios. At the same time, because resources are shifted
toward the non traded sector while the traded sector is more capital intensive, capital
increases in relative abundance.8 Hence, the sectoral capital-labor ratios return to their
initial values, thus leaving the unit cost for producing unaffected. Because the markup
falls, non traded producers set lower prices so that the real exchange rate depreciates, in
line with the evidence. Conversely, when the traded sector is more labor intensive, labor
rises in relative abundance. Consequently, capital-labor ratios fall dramatically. The return
on domestic capital rises which pushes up the unit cost by such an amount that the real
exchange rate appreciates (while the markup falls).
By affecting the return on domestic capital, the reallocation of inputs across sectors also
a limited number of intermediate good producers operate in the non-traded sector, the price-elasticity of
demand and therefore the markup faced by each firm depends on the number of competitors.
5Note that we focus on the effects of a rise in public purchases of non-traded goods because time series
of government spending indicate that its non tradable content is substantial, at around 90%.
6The substantial increase in non traded output following a rise in government spending is in line with the
evidence documented by Benetrix and Lane [2010] who find that the relative size of the non traded sector
increases disproportionately after a temporary fiscal shock.
7The unit cost function is a weighted average of the wage rate and the rental rate of capital. A fall in
sectoral capital-labor ratios has opposite effects on cost components as it raises the rental rate of capital
and lowers the wage rate. The latter effect more than offsets the former when the traded sector is more
capital intensive so that a fall in sectoral capital-labor ratios lowers the unit cost for producing.
8While both inputs are reallocated toward the non traded sector, it is only when the traded sector is
more capital intensive that capital increases in relative abundance.
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plays a key role in the determination of the responses of investment and the current account.
To see this, consider a temporary increase in government spending. As stressed in the classic
paper by Baxter and King [1993], households respond to a temporary fiscal expansion by
lowering savings, as they try to avoid a large reduction in consumption and/or a large
increase in labor supply. Reduced savings imply a decline in investment or the current
account, or both. As mentioned above, because the reallocation of inputs across sectors
keeps sectoral capital-labor ratios fixed when the traded sector is more capital intensive,
the return on domestic capital is unaffected in this case. Hence, the fall in savings drives
down both investment and the current account, in line with the evidence. With the reversal
of sectoral capital intensities, the two-sector model fails to produce a decline in investment.
When the non traded sector is more capital intensive, the large increase in the return of
domestic capital induces agents to accumulate physical capital so that investment is crowded
in instead of being crowded out.
To address the real exchange depreciation after a temporary fiscal expansion, we draw
on earlier work by Turnovsky and Sen [1995] who develop an open economy model with a
traded and a non-traded sector, but consider elastic labor supply and imperfect competi-
tion in product markets. Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] employ a similar framework to
investigate the output effects of fiscal shocks, but they restrict their analysis to a permanent
rise in public spending and consider fixed markups. When the markups are fixed, the real
exchange rate is unaffected if the traded sector is more capital intensive or appreciates with
the reversal of sectoral capital intensities, in contradiction with the evidence. Moreover, in
contrast to the authors, we analyze the implications of a temporary fiscal expansion. Be-
yond the fact that considering a transitory increase in public spending allows us to address
the VAR evidence, a temporary fiscal shock may lower investment while a permanent fiscal
shock always stimulates it.9
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the specification
of a two-sector model with traded and non-traded goods. The non-traded sector is as-
sumed to be imperfectly competitive with an endogenous markup. In section 3, we provide
an analytical exploration of the effects of temporary fiscal shocks, shedding light on the
fiscal transmission with an endogenous markup. In section 4, we report the results of our
numerical simulations and assess the ability of the model to account for the evidence. In
section 5, we summarize our main results and present our conclusions.
9To produce a fall in investment, the fiscal expansion must be temporary in order to induce agents to
reduce their savings.
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2 The Framework
We consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical
households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever.10 The country is small in
terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given world interest rate, r?. A
perfectly competitive sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T that can
be exported and consumed domestically. An imperfectly competitive sector produces a non-
traded good denoted by the superscriptN which is devoted to physical capital accumulation
and domestic consumption.11 The traded good is chosen as the numeraire.12
2.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods
denoted by CT and CN , respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of
substitution function:
C
(
CT , CN
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (1)
where ϕ is the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle
(0 < ϕ < 1) and φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) of this unit as
labor, while the remainder, l ≡ 1 − L, is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time,
households derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working.
Households decide on consumption and worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − γ 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (2)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion for consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Factor income is derived by supplying labor L at a wage rate W , and capital K at a
rental rate R. In addition, they accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield
10More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided
in a longer version of the paper with a Technical Appendix available at http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/
productions/publications/2012/2012-17.pdf.
11As stressed by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], allowing for traded capital investment would not affect the
results (qualitatively). Furthermore, like Burstein et al. [2004], we find that the non tradable content of
investment accounts for a significant share of total investment expenditure (averaging about 60%).
12The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small
open economy.
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net interest rate earnings of r?B(t). Denoting lump-sum taxes by Z, the households’ flow
budget constraint can be written as:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +R(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t)− Z − PC (P (t))C(t)− P (t)I(t), (3)
where PC is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non-
traded goods P . The last two terms represent households’ expenditure which includes
purchases of consumption goods and investment expenditure PI. Aggregate investment
gives rise to overall capital accumulation according to the dynamic equation
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (4)
where we assume that physical capital depreciates at rate δK . In the rest of this paper, the
time-argument is suppressed in order to increase clarity.
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (3) by λ the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
−σC , (5a)
L = [(λ/γ)W ]σL , (5b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (5c)
R/P − δK + P˙ /P = r?, (5d)
plus the appropriate transversality conditions. In an open economy model with a represen-
tative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect access
to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate an interior solution. This
standard assumption made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ,
will undergo a discrete jump when individuals receive new information and must remain
constant over time thereafter, i.e. λ = λ¯.
The homogeneity of C(.) allows a two-stage consumption decision: in the first stage,
consumption is determined, and the intratemporal allocation between traded and non-
traded goods is decided at the second stage. Applying Shephard’s lemma gives CN = P ′CC
where P ′C = ∂PC/∂P ; denoting by αC the share of non-traded goods in the consumption
expenditure, we have CN = αCPCC/P and CT = PCC − PCN = (1− αC)PCC.13
13Specifically, we have αC =
(1−ϕ)P1−φ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)P1−φ . Note that αC depends negatively on the relative price P as
long as φ > 1.
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2.2 Firms
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, KT and KN , and labor, LT
and LN , according to Cobb-Douglas production functions Y T =
(
KT
)θT (
LT
)1−θT and
Y N =
(
KN
)θN (
LN
)1−θN , where θT and θN represent the capital income share in output in
the traded and non-traded sectors respectively. Both sectors face two cost components: a
capital rental cost equal to R, and a labor cost equal to the wage rateW . The traded sector
is assumed to be perfectly competitive. As described in more detail below, the non-traded
sector contains a large number of industries and each industry is composed of differentiated
monopolistically competitive intermediate firms.
The final non-traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector with
constant-returns-to-scale production which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral
non-traded goods.14 We denote the elasticity of substitution between any two different sec-
toral goods by ω > 0. In each sector, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods
that are aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good. The elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties within a sector is denoted by ² > 0, and we assume that this is higher than
the elasticity of substitution across sectors, i.e. ² > ω (see Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]).
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one variety
is a price setter. Output Xi,j of firm i in sector j is produced using capital and labor, i.e.
Xi,j = H (Ki,j ,Li,j). Each firm chooses capital and labor by equalizing markup-adjusted
marginal products to the marginal cost of inputs, i. e. PHK/µ = R, and PHL/µ = W ,
where µ is the markup over the marginal costs. At a symmetric equilibrium, non-traded
output is equal to Y N = NX = H (KN , LN) where LN = NLN and KN = NKN .
Following Gal´ı [1995], we depart from the usual practice by assuming that the number
of firms is large enough so that we can ignore the strategic effects but not so large that the
effect of entry on the firm’s demand curve is minuscule. Consequently, the price elasticity of
demand faced by a single firm is no longer constant and equal to the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties, but rather a function of the number of firms N . Taking into
account the fact that output of one variety does not affect the price of final non-traded
output, but influences the sectoral price level, in a symmetric equilibrium, the resulting
price elasticity of demand is:
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (6)
14This setup builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto’s [2008] framework. Details of its derivation are therefore
relegated to the Technical Appendix of the longer version of the paper.
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Assuming that ² > ω, the price elasticity of demand faced by one single firm is an increasing
function of the number of firms N within a sector. Henceforth, the markup µ = ee−1
decreases as the number of competitors increases, i.e. µN < 0.
We assume instantaneous entry, which implies that the zero-profit condition holds at
each instant of time:
piN = P
[
Y N
N
(
1− 1
µ
)
− ψ
]
= 0, (7)
where we denote fixed costs by ψ. The zero-profit condition piN = 0 can be solved for the
number of firms.15
Since inputs can move freely between the two sectors, marginal products in the traded
and the non-traded sector equalize:
θT
(
kT
)θT−1
=
P
µ
θN
(
kN
)θN−1 ≡ R, (8a)(
1− θT ) (kT )θT = P
µ
(
1− θN) (kN)θN ≡W, (8b)
where we denote by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N ,
Aggregating labor and capital over the two sectors gives us the resource constraints for
the two inputs:
LT + LN = L, KT +KN = K. (9)
2.3 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government which finances government expenditure
by raising lump-sum taxes Z in accordance with the balanced condition:
GT + PGN = Z. (10)
Public spending consists of purchases of traded goods, GT , and non-traded goods, GN .
Since one prominent feature of the time series of government spending is that its non
tradable content is substantial, at around 90%, in the following we therefore concentrate
on the effects of a rise in public purchases of non-traded goods.
2.4 Short-Run Static Solutions
System (8a)-(8b) can be solved for sectoral capital-labor ratios: kT = kT (P, µ) and kN =
kN (P, µ). Using the fact that W ≡ (1− θT ) (kT )θT , the wage rate also depends on P and
15We assume instantaneous entry since the case of no-entry merely affects the results. In a longer version
of the paper, we provide analytical and numerical results when imposing no-entry.
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µ, i.e. W = W (P, µ), with WP ≷ 0, Wµ ≶ 0. An increase in the relative price P raises or
lowers W depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the
non-traded sector. Since a rise in µ produces opposite effects on variables to those induced
by a rise in P , we concentrate on the relative price effects to save space.
Plugging sectoral capital-labor ratios into the resource constraints and production func-
tions leads to short-term static solutions for sectoral output: Y T = Y T (K,L, P, µ) and
Y N = Y N (K,L, P, µ). According to the Rybczynski effect, a rise in K raises the output of
the sector which is more capital intensive, while a rise in L raises the output of the sector
which is more labor intensive. An increase in the relative price of non tradables exerts op-
posite effects on sectoral outputs by shifting resources away from the traded sector towards
the non-traded sector.
By substituting first W = W (P, µ), system (5a)-(5b) can be solved for consumption
and labor supply as follows: C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
with Cλ¯ < 0, CP < 0, and L = L
(
λ¯, P, µ
)
with Lλ¯ > 0, LP ≷ 0, Lµ ≶ 0. A rise in the shadow value of wealth induces agents to cut
their real expenditure and to supply more labor. By raising the consumption price index,
an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables drives down consumption. Finally,
depending on whether kT ≷ kN , a rise in P stimulates or depresses labor supply by raising
or lowering W .
The zero profit condition (7) can be solved for the number of intermediate producers
by inserting first Y N = Y N
[
K,L
(
λ¯, P, µ
)
, P, µ
]
(with µ = µ (N)). We have:
N = N
(
K,P, λ¯
)
, NK ≷ 0, NP > 0, Nλ¯ ≶ 0. (11)
Since N co-varies with non-traded output Y N , a rise in P unambiguously stimulates entry
while an increase in K (resp. in λ¯) raises the number of competitors N if the non-traded
sector is more (resp. less) capital intensive than the traded sector.
2.5 Macroeconomic Dynamics
We now describe the dynamics. The adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-
state is described by a dynamic system which comprises two equations. First, the dynamic
equation for the relative price of non-traded goods (5d) equalizes the return on domestic
capital and traded bonds r?. Second, the accumulation equation for physical capital clears
the non-traded goods market along the transitional path:
K˙ =
Y N (K,L, P, µ)
µ
− CN (λ¯, P )−GN − δKK, (12)
8
where L = L
(
λ¯, P, µ
)
and µ = µ
[
N
(
K,P, λ¯
)]
.
Linearizing (12) and (5d) which forms a separate subsystem in K and P and assuming
that the Jacobian matrix of the differential equation system has one negative eigenvalue
denoted by ν1 and one positive eigenvalue denoted by ν2, the general solutions for K and
P are:
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (13)
where B1 and B2 are constants to be determined and ωi2 is the element of the eigenvector
associated with the eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2). Two features of the two-sector economy’s
equilibrium dynamics deserve special attention. First, if the markup is fixed and the traded
sector is more capital intensive, we have to set ω12 = 0 to rule out unstable paths.
16 Hence,
the temporal path for the real exchange rate is flat when kT > kN .17 An endogenous
markup restores dynamics for the relative price. Specifically, P and K move in opposite
directions along a stable path, i.e. ω12 < 0. Second, when the expansionary policy is
transitorily implemented (i.e. the fiscal shock only lasts for T periods), two periods have to
be considered, namely a first period (labelled period 1) over which the temporary policy is
in effect, and a second period (labelled period 2) after the policy has been removed. While
the small country converges towards its new long run equilibrium over period 2, i. e. B2
must be set to zero, the economy follows unstable paths over period 1. These are described
by (13).
Substituting (12) and (10) into (3), we obtain the dynamic equation for the current
16With a fixed markup, if kT > kN , the temporal path for the relative price must be flat for the no-
arbitrage condition (5d) to be fulfilled. To see this, suppose that higher demand for non tradables pushes
up the price of non traded goods relative to traded goods, i.e. P rises. The real exchange rate appreciation
produces a shift of resources toward the non traded sector. Because the traded sector is more capital
intensive, capital increases in relative abundance, thus raising the sectoral capital-labor ratios. Hence, the
return on domestic capital R falls, thus requiring that P˙ > 0. A further increase in P raises kj ≡ Kj/Lj
more which lowers the return on domestic capital and thus requires that P˙ > 0. Hence, the real exchange
rate moves away from its steady-state value. To avoid such unstable paths, we have to set ω12 = 0. This
point is emphasized by Turnovsky and Sen [1995].
17Intuitively, as will become clear later, agents respond to a temporary fiscal expansion by raising labor
supply which lowers sectoral capital-labor ratios kj . At the same time, because resources are shifted toward
the non traded sector while the traded sector is more capital intensive, capital increases in relative abundance.
Such a reallocation of inputs restores the capital-labor ratios to their initial values. As a result, both the
wage rate and the rental rate of capital are unaffected, and so is the unit cost for producing. Consequently,
non traded producers do not change their prices. Hence, when the markup is fixed and the traded sector is
more capital intensive, a fiscal shock has no effect on the real exchange rate.
9
account (denoted by CA ≡ B˙):
B˙ = r?B + Y T (K,L, P, µ)− CT (λ¯, P )−GT , (14)
where Y T − CT −GT correspond to net exports. Linearizing (14) around the steady-state
and substituting (13), the general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:18
B(t) = B˜ +
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t. (15)
When the disturbance is temporary, we must take into account that assets (i.e. domestic
capital and foreign bonds) have been accumulated (or decumulated) over the period 1.
The time path for net foreign assets is described by eq. (15) during this unstable period.
As stocks of assets are modified over period 1 (i.e. (0, T )), we have to take new initial
conditions (i.e. BT and KT ) into account when the fiscal policy is removed.
2.6 Steady-State
We now discuss the salient features of the steady-state. Setting P˙ = 0 into (5d) and using
equality of marginal products of labor implying P˜
µ(N˜) =
ΨT
ΨN
(
W˜
R˜
)θT−θN
, we find that the
real exchange is positively tied to the markup:
P˜ = Γ
[
µ
(
N˜
)] 1−θT
1−θN (16)
where Γ > 0 is a constant equal to Ψ
T
(ΨN )
1−θT
1−θN
(
r? + δK
)− θT−θN
1−θN with Ψj =
(
θj
)θj (1− θj)1−θj
(j = T,N).19 According to (16), a fall in the markup depreciates the real exchange rate in
the long run.
Setting K˙ = 0 into (12) yields the market-clearing condition for the non-traded good:
Y N
[
K˜, L˜, P˜ , µ
(
N˜
)]
/µ
(
N˜
)
= CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+ I˜ +GN , (17)
where I˜ = δKK˜. Setting B˙ = 0 into (14) leads to the market-clearing condition for the
traded good:
Y T
[
K˜, L˜, P˜ , µ
(
N˜
)]
= −r?B˜ + CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+GT . (18)
18To avoid unnecessary complications, we give analytical expressions for Φi (with i =
1, 2) when assuming a fixed markup. If kT > kN , we have Φ1 = − P˜ ν2r?−ν1 < 0
and Φ2 = − P˜ ν1r?−ν2
{
1 +
ω22
P˜ ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)
]}
. If kN > kT , we have Φ1 =
− P˜ ν2
r?−ν1
{
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
and Φ2 = − P˜ ν1r?−ν2 .
19Setting P˙ = 0 yields R˜ = P˜ (r? + δK) which can be solved for k˜
T by using (8a). Inserting the solution
for k˜T into eq. (8b) yields W˜ =
(
ΨT
) 1
1−θT
[
P˜
(
r? + δK
)]− θT
1−θT . Computing and inserting the ratio W˜/R˜
into P˜
µ(N˜)
= Ψ
T
ΨN
(
W˜
R˜
)θT−θN
, and solving for P˜ yields (16).
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The number of firms N˜ is determined by the zero profit condition:
Y N
[
K˜, L˜, P˜ , µ
(
N˜
)] [
1−
(
1/µ
(
N˜
))]
− N˜ψ = 0. (19)
For the country to remain ultimately solvent, we have to impose one single and overall
intertemporal budget constraint:20
B0 − B˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
, (20)
where Φ1 < 0 describes the effect of capital accumulation on the external asset position
and K0 and B0 are the initial conditions.21 The five equations (16)-(20) jointly determine
P˜ , K˜, B˜, N˜ , and λ¯.
3 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: An Analytical Exploration
In this section, we analytically explore the short-run effects of a fiscal expansion. As the
shocks identified in the VAR literature are transitory, in this paper we focus the theoretical
analysis on temporary increases in government spending. We suppose that at time t = 0,
the government raises public spending on the non-traded good and at time T it removes
the expansionary budget policy.22 The higher T , the greater the persistence of the shock.23
Our model has two distinctive features: the two-sector dimension and imperfectly com-
petitive product markets with endogenous markups. In assessing the ability of the model
with tradables and non tradables to account for the evidence, we adopt a two-step approach.
First, we emphasize how an endogenous markup produces the real exchange rate depreci-
ation documented by the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal shocks. To do so, we
derive a number of analytical results by abstracting from physical capital. We then discuss
the implications of introducing physical capital in the setup. This allows us to explain how
allowing for endogenous markups is a necessary but not sufficient condition to produce a
20By first substituting the short-run solutions, then linearizing the dynamic equation of the internationally
traded bonds (14) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and P (t) and
finally invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal
budget constraint (20).
21Since for all parameterizations, Φ1 is always negative, we assume Φ1 < 0 from now on. Hence, capital
accumulation deteriorates the current account along the transitional path.
22We assume further that at the outset all agents perfectly understand the temporary nature of the policy
change. Hence, at time T , there is no new information and thus no jump in the marginal utility of wealth
at this date.
23To derive formal solutions after a temporary fiscal shock, we applied the procedure developed by Schu-
bert and Turnovsky [2002].
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real exchange rate depreciation. Second, because the simultaneous decline in investment
and the current account is one of the most consistent responses to a fiscal shock documented
in the empirical literature, we analytically assess the ability of the two-sector sector model
to account for this finding. Because considering counter-cyclical markups is not essential to
produce a crowding out of investment and a current account deficit following a temporary
fiscal expansion, we provide analytical results with a fixed markup by assuming that the
number within each non traded industry is large so that the number of competitors has no
effect on the markup.24
We first explore the implications of an endogenous markup in a two-sector open economy
without physical capital; the main result is that the real exchange rate unambiguously
depreciates after a temporary fiscal shock in a model abstracting from physical capital
accumulation. We assume constant returns-to-scale technology, i.e. Y T = LT and Y N =
LN . Due to perfect labor mobility across sectors, we have 1 = P/µ =W where the markup
µ = µ (N) decreases as the number of competitors N increases. Imposing free-entry, the
zero-profit condition can be solved for the number of firms, i.e. N = N
(
LN
)
. The resource
constraint for labor reads L = LT + LN . First-order conditions (5a)-(5c) hold. The non-
traded good market clearing condition can be rewritten as follows LN/µ = CN +GN while
the traded good market clearing condition is r?B˜ + LT = CT + GT . The intertemporal
solvency condition now reduces to B˜ = B0.25
We now investigate the effects of a temporary rise in GN . To begin with, in a model
abstracting from physical capital accumulation, all variables adjust instantaneously to their
long-run levels, except the stock of foreign assets; hence, the tilde is suppressed in order to
increase clarity. By raising (lump-sum) taxes to balance the budget and reducing house-
holds’ disposable income, a fiscal expansion produces an increase in the shadow value of
24Unfortunately, a two-sector model with endogenous markups and physical capital accumulation is ana-
lytically untractable.
25While B˜ remains unaffected after permanent fiscal shocks, a temporary rise in GN unambiguously lowers
B˜ in the long-run.
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wealth as shown formally below:26
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
Pλ¯
Y χ
[
1 + ωC(1−αC)αCωN (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
]
Ψ
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (21)
where χ < 0, Ψ > 0, ηµ,N < 0 is the elasticity of the markup to the number of competitors,
and ηN,LN > 0 the elasticity of the number of competitors to non-traded labor.27
The negative wealth effect induces agents to work more and cut real expenditure. Be-
cause the decline in real expenditure is spread over the two goods, the rise in GN more
than offsets the fall in CN so that labor in the non-traded sector unambiguously rises:28
dLN (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −ωCαCσCL
N
λ¯χωN
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+
P
χ
> 0. (22)
Higher non-traded output creates profit opportunities, inducing new firms to enter the
market. Hence, the markup µ unambiguously falls. Because P = µ W and perfect mobility
of labor implies that W = 1, non-traded producers with market power set lower prices as
they perceive a more elastic demand. As a result, the real exchange rate depreciates, in
line with the evidence.
Introducing physical capital implies that the real exchange rate does not necessarily
depreciate. Below, we emphasize that we have to assume that the traded sector is more
capital intensive to generate a real exchange rate depreciation. Specifically, non traded
producers with market power mark up prices over the unit cost UC, i.e. P = µ UC.
The unit cost for producing one unit of the non-traded good is a weighted average of the
rental rate of capital R and the wage rate W , i.e. UC = R
θNW 1−θ
N
(θN )θ
N
(1−θN )1−θN
. For the real
exchange rate to depreciate, both the markup and the unit cost must fall or alternatively
the decline in the markup must offset the rise in the unit cost. The adjustment in the unit
cost crucially depends on sectoral capital-labor ratios changes. To see it, take logarithm
and differentiate P = µ UC, and use the fact that Rˆ = − (1− θT ) kˆT and Wˆ = θT kˆT ;
26The term Ψ ≡ σL + σC (1− αC)ωC + αCωCσCχ
[
1 + (1−αC)ωC
ωN
αC (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
]
> 0, with χ =
1 − ηµ,NηN,LN
{
1− αCωC
ωN
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]
}
> 0, is a function of ηµ,N < 0, ηN,LN > 0, the ratio of
consumption expenditure to GDP (ωC =
PCC
Y
), and the ratio of non-traded output less fixed costs to GDP
(ωN =
PYN/µ
Y
= L
N
L
). Note that Ψ and χ are positive as long as the markup is not too responsive to
the entry of firms, i.e., ηµ,N < 0 is not too large. This condition always holds for reasonable values of the
markup µ.
27Since the increase in GN is only temporary, the present value of the necessary tax increases to satisfy
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is less than that of an equal but permanent increase in
GN , as captured by the scaling-down term 0 <
(
1− e−r?T
)
< 1 in eq. (21).
28The positive influence of higher GN on LN is captured by the second term on the RHS of (22). Because
the wealth effect is smaller after a temporary rise in GN than after a permanent fiscal shock, the first term
on the RHS of (22) is less negative and hence LN increases more in the former case (since CN falls less).
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denoting the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat and rearranging
terms, we get:
Pˆ = µˆ+
(
θT − θN) kˆT , (23)
where kˆT = kˆN . According to (23), the markup decline yields a real exchange rate depre-
ciation if the capital-labor ratios kj (with j = T,N) remain fixed because in this case, the
unit cost is unaffected. While a higher labor supply lowers kj = Kj/Lj on impact, the
reallocation of inputs across sectors may keep the sectoral capital-labor ratios unchanged.
More precisely, while both inputs are shifted toward the non-traded sector, capital increases
in relative abundance when the traded sector is more capital intensive. In this case, for
given P , the reallocation of inputs keeps capital-labor ratios kj fixed, thus leaving the unit
cost unchanged. Eq. (23) implies that the fall in the markup lowers the real exchange
rate. Conversely, when the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, labor increases in
relative abundance, thus lowering further the capital-labor ratios. As shown by eq. (23),
if θN > θT , reduced capital-labor ratios kj raise the unit cost by raising the rental rate
of capital. As a result, the real exchange rate may appreciate instead of depreciating. As
discussed in the next section, we find numerically that the rise in the unit cost pushes up
the real exchange rate (while the markup falls) across all scenarios when kN > kT .
We now turn to the responses of investment and the current account following a tem-
porary fiscal expansion. In order to preserve analytical tractability, we assume that the
number of competitors within each industry is large enough so that eq. (6) implies that the
price-elasticity of demand e reduces to ²; in this case, the markup is fixed, i.e. µ = ²²−1 . To
begin with, it should be mentioned that an endogenous markup is not a key ingredient to
produce either a crowding out of investment or a current account deficit.29 The realloca-
tion of inputs plays a key role instead in the determination of investment and the current
account responses. To avoid unnecessary complications, we provide analytical results for
the initial responses for investment and the current account when the traded sector is more
capital intensive than the non-traded sector.30 Formal expressions allow us to analyze the
role of the length of the fiscal shock captured by T and of the elasticity of labor supply σL.
The response of investment is the result of two opposite effects. On the one hand,
according to Rybczynski’s theorem, a rise in labor supply raises the output of the sector
which is more labor intensive and thus stimulates investment. On the other hand, because
29When discussing numerical results in the next section, we emphasize how an endogenous markup modifies
the responses of investment and the current account. As will become clear later, the fall in the markup
plays a secondary role in the adjustment of investment and the current account.
30Analytical results when kN > kT can be found in the longer version of the paper.
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the decline in real expenditure is spread over the two goods, the fall in CN is not large
enough to more than offset the rise in GN which exerts a negative effect on investment.
Hence, higher public spending GN may crowd in or crowd out capital investment. Formally,
the initial reaction of investment is ambiguous:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −
1 + (1− e−r?T )
[
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
]
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0. (24)
When setting σL = 0 in (24), the reaction of investment becomes unambiguously negative,
i.e. dI(0)/dGN = αC
(
1− e−r?T )− 1 < 0, because the rise in public spending GN exceeds
the fall in CN . As long as σL > 0, the sign of (24) is no longer clear-cut. The less responsive
the labor supply (i.e. the smaller σL) or the shorter the fiscal expansion (i.e. the lower T ),
the more likely it is that investment is crowded out by public spending.31 When the fiscal
shock is short-lived, the negative wealth effect is smaller so that labor supply and hence
Y N increases less while consumption of non-tradables CN falls by a smaller amount.
Turning to the initial response of the current account, we obtain after computation:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −P˜ e−r?T + P˜
1 + (1− e−r?T )
[
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
]
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0.
(25)
The first term on the RHS of (25) represents the negative impact of reduced savings on the
current account. The second term on the RHS of (25) represents the influence of investment
on the net foreign asset position. When setting σL to zero into (25), the initial current ac-
count response, given by dCA(0)/dGN = P˜ (1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T ), becomes unambiguously
positive. The reason is that the decline in investment is large enough to more than offset the
drop in private savings induced by the smoothing behavior. The more responsive the labor
supply (i.e. σL is higher), the smaller the decline in investment on impact, and hence the
more likely it is that the open economy experiences a current account deficit. The length
of the shock T exerts two opposite effects on the initial response of the current account.
On the one hand, as the fiscal shock is shorter (i.e. T becomes smaller) agents are more
willing to reduce private savings which amplifies the deterioration in the net foreign asset
position. On the other hand, investment declines more which exerts a positive effect on the
current account. The overall effect will be determined numerically.
When the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, investment is less likely to be
crowded out by public spending than if kT > kN . In the latter case, the reallocation of
31More precisely, when T is smaller than the critical date Tˆ = − 1
r?
ln
[
(σC C˜T−σLL˜k˜N P˜ ν2)
(σLL˜k˜T P˜ (ν1+δK)−σC P˜ C˜N)
]
, then
investment is crowded out by public spending.
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inputs keep sectoral capital-intensities fixed so that the real exchange rate remains unaf-
fected by the fiscal shock. Conversely, when the non-traded sector is more capital intensive,
the real exchange rate appreciates because the unit cost for producing rises. By shifting re-
sources toward the non-traded sector, the rise in P has an expansionary effect on non-traded
output and thus on investment.
4 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: A Quantitative Exploration
In this section, we quantitatively analyze the effects of a temporary rise in government
spending. For this purpose we numerically solve the open economy model with endogenous
markups. In the following we thus first discuss parameter values before turning to the
short-term effects of the fiscal shock.
4.1 Baseline Parametrization
Since we calibrate a two-sector model with tradables and non-tradables, we pay particular
attention to the suitability of the non-tradable content of the model to the data. Table 1
summarizes the non-tradable content of GDP, employment, consumption, and government
spending, and gives the share of government spending on the traded and non-traded good in
the sectoral output, the shares of capital income in output in both sectors, and the markup
charged by the non-traded sector for all countries of our sample.32
We start by describing the calibration of consumption-side parameters which we use as
a baseline. The world interest rate which is equal to the subjective time discount rate β
is set to 1%. One period of time corresponds to a quarter. The elasticity of substitution
between traded and non-traded goods φ is set to 1.5 (see e.g. Cashin and Mc Dermott
[2003]). The weight ϕ of consumption of tradables is set to 0.5 in the baseline calibration
to target a non-tradable content in total consumption expenditure (i.e. αC) of 45%, in line
with our estimates. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption σC is set
to 0.5 because empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests values smaller than one. One
critical parameter is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply σL. In our
baseline parametrization, we set σL = 0.5, in line with evidence reported by Domeij and
Flode´n [2006].
We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical
32Our sample covers thirteen OECD economies over the period 1970-2004. Targeted ratios when calibrat-
ing are the thirteen OECD countries’ unweighted average.
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capital depreciates at a rate δK = 1.5% to target an investment-GDP ratio of 20%. The
shares of sectoral capital income in output take two different values depending on whether
the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. In line with
our estimates, if kT > kN , θT and θN are set to 0.4 and 0.3, respectively.33 Alternatively,
when kN > kT , we choose θT = 0.3 and θN = 0.4. Setting the elasticity of substitution
between sectoral goods, ω, to 1 and the elasticity of substitution between varieties, ², to 4
yields a markup µ charged by the non-traded sector of 1.35, which is close to the thirteen
OECD countries’ unweighted average.
We set GN and GT so as to yield a non-tradable share of government spending of 90%,
and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%.34 We consider three different scenarios
for the duration of the fiscal shock: a short-lived (T = 8), a medium-lived (T = 16), and a
long-lived (T = 32) fiscal shock. As the baseline scenario, we take the medium-lived fiscal
shock, i.e. a shock that lasts 16 quarters. In this case, the cumulative increase in government
spending corresponds approximately to the cumulative increase in US government spending
six years after an exogenous spending shock by one percentage point of GDP according to
the estimates reported by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2011]. For T = 16, we also conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the elasticity of labor supply (i.e. we set σL to 0.1 and 1).
——————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
——————————————————————-
4.2 Short-Run Effects
We now discuss the short-run effects of the fiscal expansion. We take the medium-lived
spending shock as our baseline scenario, but we also refer to short-lived and long-lived
fiscal shocks, as the length of fiscal stimulus may vary across countries. Panels A and B of
Table 2 show the results for this situation, as well as for a number of alternative scenarios.
While panel A gives the response on impact, panel B displays the cumulative responses
over the first two years (i.e. eight quarters) after the shock. In order to emphasize how an
33Table 1 gives the values of θj (j = T,N). The values of θT and θN we have chosen correspond roughly
to the averages for countries with kT > kN . For these values, the non-tradable content of GDP and labor
are 63% and 66%, respectively. When kN > kT , we can use reverse but symmetric values for θN so that
the size of kT − kN remains unchanged. For θT = 0.3 and θN = 0.4, the non-tradable contents of GDP and
labor are 69% and 65%, respectively.
34Close to the average of the values reported in Table 1, the ratios GT /Y T and GN/Y N are 6% and 28%
in the baseline calibration.
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endogenous markup improves the predictive power of the two-sector model, we numerically
solve the model with a fixed markup as well. Numerical results for a fixed markup are
shown in the first column when kT > kN and in the seventh column with the reversal of
sectoral capital intensities.
Before analyzing in detail the role of counter-cyclical markups and sectoral reallocation
in shaping the short-run dynamics in response to a temporary increase in government
spending, we should mention the set of empirical evidence established by Corsetti et al.
[2012] which confirms earlier findings by Monacelli and Perotti [2010]. Using a sample
of seventeen OECD countries over the period 1975-2008, it is found that an exogenous
increase in government spending moderately raises output, induces a simultaneous decline
in investment and the current account and depreciates the real exchange rate. In the
following, we discuss the predictions of our model for the behavior of these variables when
kT > kN and when kN > kT .
We first address the response of the real exchange rate to a temporary fiscal expansion.
As shown in panel A of Table 2, P drops on impact across all scenarios, as long as the
markup is endogenous and the traded sector is more capital intensive. When kT > kN , the
cumulative responses shown in panel B reveal that the real exchange rate depreciates by
0.11% for the baseline scenario while P remains unaffected if the markup is fixed (see the
first column). The intuition behind this result is as follows. By producing a negative wealth
effect, a fiscal expansion induces agents to supply more labor, which lowers sectoral capital-
labor ratios. At the same time, because resources are shifted toward the non traded sector
while the traded sector is more capital intensive, capital increases in relative abundance.
As a result, the reallocation of inputs restores the sectoral capital-labor ratios to their
initial values. Hence, the unit cost of producing is unaffected so that non traded producers
do not change their prices along the transitional path. While this chain of events holds
when markups are counter-cyclical, the shift of resources toward the non-traded sector and
the resulting increase in non-traded output produces an additional channel through which
government spending influences the real exchange rate. More precisely, because a temporary
fiscal shock has an expansionary effect on non-traded output, profit opportunities trigger
firm entry which reduces the markup and thus induces non traded producers to set lower
prices. Consequently, if the traded sector is more capital intensive and the markup is
endogenous, the real exchange rate depreciates in all scenarios following a fiscal expansion,
as shown in panel B of Table 2.
Conversely, whether the markup is fixed or endogenous, the real exchange rate appre-
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ciates when kN > kT , as shown in panel A and panel B of Table 2. In this case, resources
move toward the non-traded sector while the traded sector is more labor intensive. Because
labor increases in relative abundance, sectoral capital-labor ratios fall. The rental rate of
capital and thus the unit cost of producing rises, which induces non-traded producers to
set higher prices. Hence, the real exchange rate appreciates in this configuration, although
the markup falls when µ is endogenous.
We now turn to the output effects of a fiscal expansion. While employment and thus
GDP increases in all the scenarios where kT > kN , labor supply and output rise slightly
or decrease when the sectoral capital intensities are reversed. The reason is that when
kT > kN , agents are induced to supply more labor as a result of the wealth effect. By
contrast, when kN > kT , the appreciation of the real exchange rate drives down the wage
rate by reducing sectoral capital-labor ratios, which in turn counteracts the wealth effect.
When contrasting the output effect in the case of an endogenous markup with that in the
case of a fixed markup, panel A of Table 2 shows that a counter-cyclical markup moderates
the increase in GDP. The reason is that sectoral capital-labor ratios fall slightly when
kT > kN and drop dramatically if kN > kT .35 Hence, with an endogenous markup, the
wage rate declines, regardless of sectoral capital intensities, which in turn moderates the
rise in labor supply, and thus the expansionary effect on GDP.
In line with our theoretical predictions, we find numerically that the short-run response
of investment depends heavily on sectoral capital intensities. On impact, an increase in
GN crowds out investment only if the traded sector is more capital intensive. In this case,
while non-traded output expands as a result of the increase in labor supply, the rise in
public spending GN produces an excess of demand which must be eliminated by a drop
in investment. As shown in the seventh line of panel A of Table 2, the less elastic labor
supply is, the larger the crowding-out of investment. Moreover, as discussed in section 3,
when the length of the fiscal shock increases (i.e. T is higher), consumption falls more
because the negative wealth effect is larger so that investment declines less. For kT > kN ,
the cumulative responses reported in the third line of panel B of Table 2 show that a fiscal
expansion crowds out investment by 3.16% of initial GDP if the markup is fixed and by
3.55% if the markup is endogenous. The larger drop in investment when markups are
counter-cyclical stems from the real exchange rate depreciation which exerts a negative
35It should be mentioned that when the traded sector is more capital intensive, sectoral capital-labor ratios
only fall if the markup is endogenous while kj ≡ Kj/Lj remain unaffected if the markup is fixed. More
precisely, for given P, the reallocation of inputs keeps kj unchanged. Because P falls with an endogenous
markup, resources move toward the traded sector; capital-labor ratios kj drop by a small amount though.
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impact on non-traded output and thus on physical capital accumulation.
By contrast, if the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the increase inGN triggers
an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables P which stimulates Y N and hence
investment, in all scenarios. The cumulative responses reported in the third line of panel
B of Table 2 show that a fiscal expansion crowds in investment by 3.22% if the markup is
fixed and 4.28% of initial GDP when the markup is endogenous. A counter-cyclical markup
amplifies the rise in investment following a fiscal shock when kN > kT because the entry
of new firms induces non-traded producers to raise output further (i.e. Y N rises more) as
they perceive a more elastic demand.
As shown in the eighth line of panel B of Table 2, the open economy experiences a
current account deficit, regardless of sectoral capital intensities.36 In both cases, agents
smooth consumption by reducing private savings, which in turn deteriorates the net foreign
asset position. When kT > kN , the decline in the current account triggered by the fall
in savings is moderated by the drop in investment. The current account deficit after two
years shrinks from 3.91% with a fixed markup of initial GDP to 3.61% with an endogenous
markup because in the latter case, investment falls more. As shown in panel B of Table 2,
in line with our theoretical predictions, the more responsive the labor supply is, the larger
the current account deficit. Moreover, while analytically, increasing the length of the fiscal
shock captured by T has an ambiguous effect on the size of the current account deficit
because it moderates the decline in both savings and investment, numerical results reveal
that the latter effect predominates so that the net foreign asset position deteriorates more
when raising T from T = 16 to T = 32.37 When the non-traded sector is more capital
intensive, as shown in panel B of Table 2, the open economy runs a substantial current
account deficit as savings fall while investment rises.
——————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 2 about here >
——————————————————————-
36It is worth noting that the current account begins to show a surplus on impact when the markup is
endogenous while the current account falls immediately if the markup is fixed, as shown in panel A of
Table 2. The reason is that in the former case, investment falls dramatically. However, the current account
deteriorates rapidly.
37Cardi and Mu¨ller [2011] provide point estimates for GDP, investment and current account responses
after an exogenous increase in government spending by one percentage point of GDP. When comparing our
results when kT > kN (panel B of Table 2) with the numbers reported by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2011], we find
that our two-sector model tends to overpredict both the crowding out of investment and the current account
deficit, while it predicts the GDP response pretty well.
20
——————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
——————————————————————-
We have also computed the impact and cumulative responses of the real consumption
wage, i.e. W/PC . The analysis of the adjustment of the real wage is of particular interest
since a number of empirical studies, specifically Pappa [2009] and Perotti [2007] for the US
and Benetrix [2012] for eleven Euro area countries, find that the real consumption wage in-
creases following a rise in government spending while the standard one-sector open economy
model predicts the opposite. The reason is that agents supply more labor, which lowers
the capital-labor ratio and therefore the real wage. By contrast, a two-sector neoclassical
model may produce an increase in the real consumption wage due to the combined effect
of the reallocation of inputs and of a counter-cyclical markup. To see it, let us assume that
the traded sector is more capital intensive. In this configuration, the reallocation of inputs
prevents the wage rate from decreasing by keeping the sectoral capital-labor ratios fixed for
given P . Moreover, by producing a real exchange rate depreciation and thus a fall in the
consumption price index, a decline in the markup may push up the real consumption wage.
By contrast, when the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, a fiscal shock unambigu-
ously lowers the real consumption wage by reducing the wage rate W and appreciating the
real exchange rate.
In the light of our discussion above, we concentrate on the most interesting case, i.e.
kT > kN . As shown in the fourth line of panel A of Table 2, if the traded sector is more
capital intensive, the decline in the wage rate more than offsets the drop in the consumption
price index so that the real consumption wage decreases on impact in all scenarios. While
the reallocation of inputs keep capital-labor ratios kj fixed for given P , the real exchange
rate depreciation induces a shift a resources toward the traded sector, thus reducing kj .
While the capital-labor ratios fall by a small amount, the consecutive drop in W is large
enough to drive down the real wage. The second line of panel B shows that the two-year
horizon cumulative response of the real wage is negative for the baseline scenario. Only if
the fiscal shock is short-lived or long-lived (i.e., GN is raised over 8 or 32 quarters) does
the cumulative response of the real wage become positive, as displayed in the second line of
panel B of Table 2. After a long-lived fiscal shock, both non-traded output expansion and,
as a consequence, firm entry are larger. Hence, the decline in the markup is large enough
to produce a positive cumulative response of the real wage. Following a short-lived fiscal
shock, the real exchange rate appreciates rapidly after its short-term depreciation, and it
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has a positive impact on the wage rate by raising the capital-labor ratios.
The last dimension of the fiscal policy transmission that our model highlights is the
sectoral effects of a rise in government spending. Only a few previous studies have esti-
mated the effects of a boost to government spending on sectoral outputs. Among these,
Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010] find that fiscal spending shocks generate a shift in the sectoral
composition of output as public purchases disproportionately benefit the non-traded sector.
As summarized in the last two lines of panels A and B of Table 2, across all the scenarios,
we find numerically that a rise in government spending boosts non-traded output, more so
if the non-traded sector is more capital intensive.
4.3 Transitional Adjustment
We now discuss the dynamic effects. The transitional paths of key variables under the base-
line and alternative scenarios are displayed in Figure 1. The responses of GDP, investment
and current account are expressed as a percentage of the initial steady-state output, while
the real exchange rate and the real wage are given as the percentage deviation from the
initial steady state. Horizontal axes measure quarters. The solid line gives results for an
endogenous markup and the dashed line for a fixed markup.
The transitional path of investment is quite distinct, depending on whether the traded
sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Along the transitional
path, capital accumulation clears the non-traded good market. When kT > kN , the size of
the crowding-out of investment falls over time, but when kN > kT , investment decreases
monotonically as the depreciation in the relative price P (after its initial appreciation)
lowers non-traded output. After about 2 years, the investment flow becomes negative and
the open economy decumulates physical capital until the fiscal policy is removed. At time
T , government spending GN reverts back to its initial level which releases resources for
capital accumulation. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, investment is crowded in.
The temporal path for GDP is driven by the adjustments in both labor and capital. In
the case kT > kN , because labor increases less when the markup is endogenous than if the
markup is fixed, GDP rises by a smaller amount on impact. The dynamics for GDP are the
mirror image of capital accumulation: the slowdown in GDP growth as government spending
is raised originates from the crowding out of investment. By contrast, when kN > kT , the
temporal path of output is hump-shaped: GDP growth first increases as labor supply rises,
and then slows down as a result of the negative investment flow which starts after about
two years. At the time the fiscal policy is removed, the economy experiences an investment
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boom which boosts GDP in both cases when the markup is fixed.
Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, the current account stays in deficit while gov-
ernment spending is raised. In the case kT > kN , the decumulation of foreign bonds
reflects the negative impact of consumption smoothing behavior on the current account,
even though the crowding out of investment counteracts this effect. If the sectoral capital
intensities are reversed, the depreciation in the relative price of non tradables reduces in-
vestment, which exerts a positive impact on the current account. Yet in the latter case,
the current account deficit at a horizon of two years is almost three times larger than if
kT > kN , as shown in the fourth line of panel B of Table 2.
As shown in the fifth row of Figure 1, if the traded sector is more capital intensive, the
real exchange rate falls when the markup is endogenous while the dynamics for P degenerate
when the markup is fixed. In the former case, the dynamics of the real exchange rate are
U-shaped.38 When kT > kN , the fifth row of Figure 1 indicates that the real exchange
appreciates after eight quarters but P remains below its initial level. As displayed in the
last row of Figure 1, while the real exchange rate depreciation is not large enough to push
the real wage on impact, the dynamic path for W/PC reveals that it increases along the
transitional path and exceeds its initial level after about 6 quarters.39
5 Conclusion
A robust conclusion emerging from empirical papers is that government spending tends
to depreciate the real exchange rate and to crowd out both investment and the current
account. In this paper, we build a neoclassical model with counter-cyclical markups that
can simultaneously match all these facts. We show that the open economy version of
the two-sector neoclassical model with traded and non-traded goods can account for the
empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal shocks, but only if markups are endogenous and the
traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. While both ingredients
38The reason is as follows. The real exchange rate depreciation shifts resources towards the traded sector.
Since the non-traded sector is more labor intensive, the sectoral capital-labor ratios fall, which in turn raises
the return on domestic capital. According to (5d), for the no-arbitrage condition to hold, the real exchange
rate must decline over time, i.e. P˙ /P < 0. However, the fall in µ exerts opposite effects on R. At a certain
date, the decline in the markup is large enough to offset the impact of the relative price on the return of
capital.
39While the initial fall in the real consumption wage does not conform to the findings by Perotti [2007] and
Benetrix [2012], it should be mentioned that the dynamics for W/PC accommodate pretty well the evidence
documented by Ramey [2011] who finds that the real wage falls on impact, rises along the transitional path
and exceeds its initial level after four or eight quarters, depending on the period considered.
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are essential to account for the real exchange rate depreciation, only the second ingredient
is necessary to account for the simultaneous decline in investment and the current account.
We also find that our model may produce the positive response of the real wage doc-
umented by Perotti [2007] for the U.S. and more recently by Benetrix [2012] who use a
sample of eleven Euro area countries. In our model, the rise in the real consumption wage
stems from the real exchange rate depreciation which lowers the consumption price index
while the wage rate falls by a small amount. Our numerical results reveal that the real
consumption wage increases only if the fiscal shock is short- or long-lived, not if it holds for
a medium term.
In conclusion, we must stress a number of caveats. If the non-traded sector is assumed
to be the more capital intensive sector, the model fails to match the evidence along a
number of dimensions. Notably, in this case, the two-sector model cannot account for the
crowding-out of investment which is one of the most consistent responses to a fiscal shock
documented in the empirical literature. Additionally, if the traded sector is more capital
intensive than the non-traded sector, the model fails to produce a positive cumulative
response of the real wage in the baseline scenario. We believe that allowing for imperfect
mobility of labor across sectors, along the lines of Horvath [2000], might solve these two
puzzles. The difficulty in reallocating labor should produce a rise in sectoral capital-labor
ratios because the non-traded sector experiences a small labor inflow if the cost of shifting is
large enough, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. Higher sectoral capital-labor ratios
lower the return of domestic capital and raises the wage rate. As a result, investment should
fall while the real consumption wage should rise.
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Figure 1: Effect of government spending shocks. Notes: variables are measured in percent-
age points of output, with the exception of employment, the real exchange rate and real
consumption wage which are scaled by their initial steady-state values. The solid line shows
results for an endogenous markup and the dashed line for a fixed markup.
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FISCAL SHOCKS IN A TWO SECTOR OPEN
ECONOMY WITH ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A Short-Run Static Solutions
In this section, we compute short-run static solutions. It is worthwhile noting that in
this paper, we assume that the non-traded sector is imperfectly competitive and charges
a markup denoted by µ. We also allow for the markup to be endogenous in section 3
in the text. In order to isolate the influence of markup variations on variables, i.e. the
competition channel, we express variables in terms of the markup; hence, we treat µ as
an exogenous variable in computing short-run static solutions. For example, if a short-
run static solution is given by x = x
(
λ¯, P, µ
)
with λ¯ the shadow value of wealth, P the
relative price of non tradables and µ the markup, the variable x is only affected by λ¯ and
P in the case of fixed markup while x is influenced also by the competition channel when
we allow for the markup to be endogenous. In section K, we set out the model with an
imperfectly competitive non-traded sector, assuming that a limited number of competitors
operate within each sector. When the number of competitors is large, the imperfectly
competitive non-traded sector charges a fixed markup. In section L, we set out the model
with an imperfectly competitive non-traded sector, assuming that the number of firms is
fixed so that profits are no longer driven down to zero. In section M, we solve the model
with endogenous markups by abstracting from physical capital and derive formal solutions
for temporary fiscal shocks.
A.1 Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption-Side
In this subsection, we compute short-run static solutions for real consumption and labor
supply. Static efficiency conditions (5a) and (5b) can be solved for consumption and labor
which of course must hold at any point of time:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
, L = L
(
λ¯, P, µ
)
, (26)
with
Cλ¯ =
∂C
∂λ¯
= −σCC
λ¯
< 0, (27a)
CP =
∂C
∂P
= −αCσCC
P
< 0, (27b)
Lλ¯ =
∂L
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
> 0, (27c)
LP =
∂L
∂P
= σLL
WP
W
= −σLL 1
W
kTh
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (27d)
Lµ =
∂L
∂µ
= σLL
Wµ
W
= σLL
1
W
kTPh
(µ)2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (27e)
where σC and σL correspond to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption
and labor, respectively.
Denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the
non tradable good and inserting short-run solution for consumption (26) into intra-temporal
allocations between non tradable and tradable goods, we solve for CT and CN :
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, (28)
with
CTλ¯ = −σC
CT
λ¯
< 0, (29a)
CTP = αC
CT
P
(φ− σC) ≶ 0, (29b)
CNλ¯ = −σC
CN
λ¯
< 0, (29c)
CNP = −
CN
P
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] < 0, (29d)
where we used the fact that −P ′′CP
P ′C
= φ (1− αC) > 0 and P ′CC = CN .
A.2 Short-Run Static Solutions for Production-Side
Capital-Labor Ratios
From static optimality conditions (8a) and (8b), we may express sector capital-labor
ratios as functions of the real exchange rate:
kT = kT (P, µ) , kN = kN (P, µ) , (30)
with
kTP =
∂kT
∂P
=
h
µfkk (kN − kT ) , (31a)
kTµ =
∂kT
∂µ
= − Ph
(µ)2 fkk (kN − kT )
, (31b)
kNP =
∂kN
∂P
=
µf
P 2hkk (kN − kT ) . (31c)
kNµ =
∂kN
∂µ
= − f
Phkk (kN − kT ) . (31d)
Wage
Equality
[
f
(
kT
)− kT fk (kT )] ≡W can be solved for the wage rate:
W =W (P, µ) , (32)
with
WP =
∂W
∂P
= −kT fkkkTP = −kT
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (33a)
Wµ = −∂W
∂µ
= −kT fkkkTµ = kT
Ph
(µ)2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0. (33b)
Labor
Substituting short-run static solutions for labor (26) and capital-labor ratios (30) into
the resource constraints for capital and labor (9), we can solve for traded and non-traded
labor as follows:
LT = LT
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, LN = LN
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, (34)
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with
LTK =
∂LT
∂K
=
1
kT − kN ≶ 0, (35a)
LTP =
∂LT
∂P
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
P 2hkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNh
]
< 0, (35b)
LTµ =
∂LT
∂µ
= − 1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LTPh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
Phkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNPh
]
> 0, (35c)
LTλ¯ =
∂LT
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kN
kN − kT ≷ 0, (35d)
LNK =
∂LN
∂K
=
1
kN − kT ≷ 0, (35e)
LNP =
∂LN
∂P
= − 1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
P 2hkk
− σLL 1
W
(
kT
)2
h
]
> 0, (35f)
LNµ =
∂LN
∂µ
=
1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LTPh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
Phkk
− σLL 1
W
(
kT
)2
Ph
]
< 0, (35g)
LNλ¯ =
∂LN
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kT
kN − kT ≶ 0. (35h)
(35i)
Output
Inserting short-run static solutions for capital-labor ratios (30) and for labor (35) into
the production functions, we can solve for traded output, Y T = LT f
(
kT
)
, and non-traded
output, Y N = LNh
(
kN
)
:
Y T = Y T
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, Y N = Y N
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, (36)
with
Y TK =
∂Y T
∂K
= − f
kN − kT ≶ 0, (37a)
Y TP =
∂Y T
∂P
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
PLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
(P )2 hkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNhf
]
< 0, (37b)
Y Tµ =
∂Y T
∂µ
= − 1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LT (Ph)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
Phkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNPhf
]
> 0,(37c)
Y Tλ¯ =
∂Y T
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, (37d)
Y NK =
∂Y N
∂K
=
h
kN − kT ≷ 0, (37e)
Y NP =
∂Y N
∂P
= − 1
P (kN − kT )2
[
PLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
P 2hkk
− P
µ
σLL
1
W
(
kTh
)2]
> 0.(37f)
Y Nµ =
∂Y N
∂µ
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
PLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
P 2hkk
− P
µ
σLL
1
W
(
kTh
)2]
< 0, (37g)
Y Nλ¯ =
∂Y N
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kTh
kN − kT ≶ 0, (37h)
From (37b) and (37f), an appreciation in the real exchange rate attracts resources from the
traded to the non-traded sector which in turn raises the output of the latter. From (37a)
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and (37e), a rise in the capital stock raises the output of the sector which is relatively more
capital intensive. From (37d) and (37h), an increase in the marginal utility of wealth raises
labor supply and thereby increases output in the sector which is more labor intensive.
For clarity purpose, in the text, we write out short-run static solutions by expressing
output in terms of labor supply, i.e. Y T = Y T (K,L, P, µ) and Y N = Y N (K,L, P, µ). The
partial derivatives of sectoral output w. r. t. to labor are:
Y TL =
∂Y T
∂L
=
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, Y
N
L =
∂Y N
∂L
= − k
Th
kN − kT ≶ 0. (38)
Useful Properties
Making use of (37b) and (37f), (37a) and (37e), we deduce the following useful properties:
Y TP + P
Y NP
µ
= −σLL k
Th
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (39a)
Y TK +
P
µ
Y NK =
µf − Ph
µ (kT − kN ) =
P
µ
hk = fk, (39b)
Y TL + P
Y NL
µ
= W, (39c)
Y Tµ + P
Y Nµ
µ
= σLLkT
Ph
µ2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (39d)
Y Tλ¯ + P
Y N
λ¯
µ
= σL
L
λ¯
(
kNµf − kTPh)
µ (kN − kT ) = σL
L
λ¯
W > 0, (39e)
where we used the fact that µf ≡ P [h− hk (kN − kT )] and kNµf−kTPh = P (h− hKkN) (kN − kT ) =
µW
(
kN − kT ).
In addition, using the fact that rK = fk
[
kT (P, µ)
]
, the rental rate of capital denoted
by rK can be expressed as a function of the real exchange rate P and the mark-up µ:
rK = rK (P, µ) , (40)
with partial derivatives given by:
rKP ≡
∂rK
∂P
=
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (41a)
rµP ≡
∂rK
∂µ
= − Ph
µ2 (kN − kT ) ≶ 0. (41b)
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions (26), (28) and (36) into (5d) and (12), we obtain:
K˙ =
1
µ
Y N
(
K,P, λ¯
)− CN (λ¯, P )− δKK −GN , (42a)
P˙ = P
{
r? + δK − hk [(P )]
µ
}
. (42b)
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, P˜ the long-
term values of x = K,P , we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, P˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, P (t)− P˜
)T
, (43)
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where J is given by
J ≡
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
, (44)
with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, b12 = Y NP
µ
− CNP > 0, (45a)
b21 = 0, b22 = −P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) = Y TK
P˜
≶ 0. (45b)
Equilibrium Dynamics
By denoting ν the eigenvalue of matrix J, the characteristic equation for the matrix of
the linearized system (43) can be written as follows:
ν2 − 1
P˜
(
Y TK +
P˜
µ˜
Y NK − δK P˜
)
ν +
Y TK
P˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
= 0. (46)
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2× 2 matrix (44) is unambiguously
negative:40
Det J = b11b22 =
Y TK
P˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
< 0, (47)
and the trace denoted by Tr is given by
Tr J = b11 + b22 =
1
P˜
(
Y TK +
P˜
µ˜
Y NK
)
−−δK = hk
µ
− δK = r? > 0, (48)
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium hkµ = r
? + δK .
From (46), the characteristic root reads as:
νi ≡ 12
r? ±
√
(r?)2 − 4Y
T
K
P˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
) ≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (49)
Using (48), then (49) can be rewritten as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{
r? ±
[
Y TK
P˜
−
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)]}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (50)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (51)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, P , the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
Formal Solutions
General solutions paths are given by :
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (52a)
P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (52b)
40Starting with the equality of labor marginal products across sectors, using the fact that fk =
P
µ
hk and
hk/µ = r
? + δK , it is straightforward to prove that b11 is positive in the case k
N > kT .
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where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given
by
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
, (53)
with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, (54a)
b12 =
Y NP
µ
− CNP > 0, (54b)
where CNP is given by (29d).
Case kN > kT
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the non-traded good
sector exceeds the capital-labor of the traded sector. From (51), the stable and unstable
eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 = − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) < 0, (55a)
ν2 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK > 0, (55b)
since we suppose that kN > kT .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν2 + δK) > 0, (56a)
Y TK = P˜ ν1 < 0, (56b)
P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= −ν1 > 0, (56c)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν2 + δK) < 0, (56d)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν1 > 0. (56e)
We write out eigenvector ωi associated with eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2), to determine
their signs:
ω1 =
 1 (+)ν1−ν2(
Y N
P
µ
−CNP
) (−)
 , ω2 = ( 1 (+)
0
)
. (57)
Case kT > kN
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor ratio of the non-traded sector. From (51), the stable and unstable
eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK < 0, (58a)
ν2 = − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) > 0, (58b)
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since we suppose that kT > kN .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν1 + δK) < 0, (59a)
Y TK = P˜ ν2 > 0, (59b)
P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= −ν2 < 0, (59c)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν1 + δK) > 0, (59d)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν2 < 0. (59e)
We write out eigenvector ωi associated with eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2), to determine
their signs:
ω1 =
(
1 (+)
0
)
, ω2 =
 0ν2−ν1(
Y N
P
µ
−CNP
) (+)
 . (60)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We first linearize equation (24) around the steady-state:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
+ Y TK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[
Y TP − CTP
] (
P (t)− P˜
)
. (61)
where CTP is given by (29b).
Inserting general solutions for K(t) and P (t), the solution for the stock of international
assets is given by follows:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
+ Y TK
2∑
i=1
Bie
νit +
[
Y TP − CTP
] 2∑
i=1
Biω
i
2e
νit. (62)
Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:
B(t)− B˜ =
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (63)
with
Φi =
Ni
νi − r? =
Y TK +
[
Y TP − CTP
]
ωi2
νi − r? , i = 1, 2. (64)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the terms in brackets
of equation (53) must be null and we must set B2 = 0. We obtain the linearized version of
the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
B0 − B˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (65)
The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
B(t)− B˜ = Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
. (66)
Case kN > kT
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12,
= P˜ ν2
{
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
≷ 0, (67a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω22, (67b)
= Y TK = P˜ ν1 < 0, (67c)
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where (67c) follows from the fact that ω22 = 0. We made use of property (338) together
with the fact that CTP = PCCP −PCNP to compute Y TP −CTP = −P˜
(
Y NP
µ − CNP
)
−PCCP −
σLL˜k˜
T (ν2 + δK) ≷ 0.
The sign of Φ1 is ambiguous and reflects the impact of capital accumulation on the
foreign asset accumulation along a stable transitional path:
B˙(t) = Φ1K˙(t).
where K˙(t) = ν1B1eν1t. Following empirical evidence suggesting that the current account
and investment are negatively correlated (see e. g. Glick and Rogoff [1995]), we will impose
thereafter:
Assumption 1 Φ1 < 0 which implies that N1 > 0.
The condition for the assumption to hold, i. e. N1 > 0, may be rewritten as follows:
ν2 > −ω
1
2
P˜
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
. (68)
Note that, for all parametrization, we find Φ1 < 0. Using (64), Φi (i = 1, 2) can be written
as follows:
Φ1 = −P˜
{
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
< 0, Φ2 = −P˜ < 0. (69)
Case kT > kN
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12,
= Y TK = P˜ ν2 > 0, (70a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω22,
= P˜ ν1
{
1 +
ω22
P˜ ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δk)
]}
,≶ 0, (70b)
where (70b) follows from the fact that ω12 = 0. We made use of property (338) together with
CTP = PCCP−PCNP to compute Y TP −CTP = −P˜
(
Y NP
µ − CNP
)
−PCCP−σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK) ≷ 0.
Using (64), Φi (i = 1, 2) can be written as follows:
Φ1 = −P˜ < 0, Φ2 = −P˜
{
1 +
ω22
P˜ ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δk)
]}
< 0. (71)
C Derivation of the Current Account Equation
In this section, we derive the current account equation. Substituting the definition of lump-
sum taxes Z by using (10), the market clearing condition for non-traded goods (12) into
(3) we get:
B˙ = r?B + rKK(t) +WL− PCC − PI − Z,
= r?B +
(
rKK +WL
)− PCC − P (Y N
µ
− CN −GN
)
.
Using the fact that LT + LN = L, KT + KN = K, , the dynamic equation for the
current account can be rewritten as follows:
B˙ = r?B +
[
WLT + rKKT
]
+
[
WLN + rKKN
]− P Y N
µ
− CT −GT ,
= r?B + Y T − CT −GT ,
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where variable cost WLN + rKKN in the non-traded sector and output net of fixed cost in
that sector, i. e. Y
N
µ = Z
N , cancel each other.41
D Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case
of Elastic Labor Supply
In this section, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by maintaining
the assumption of an elastic labor supply. Since we assume free entry, then we set Π˜N = 0
into eq. (17).
Inserting first the appropriate short-un static solutions, the steady-state of the economy
is obtained by setting K˙, P˙ , B˙ = 0 and is defined by the following set of equations:
hk
[
kN
(
P˜
)]
µ
= r? + δK , (72a)
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
µ
− CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GN − δKK˜ = 0, (72b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GT = 0, (72c)
and the intertemporal solvency condition(
B0 − B˜
)
= Φ
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (72d)
The steady-state equilibrium composed by these four equations jointly determine P˜ , K˜, B˜
and λ¯.
We totally differentiate the system (72) evaluated at the steady-state which yields in a
matrix form:
hkkk
N
P
µ 0 0 0(
Y NP
µ − CNP
)
Y NK
µ − δK
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − CNλ¯
)
0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK
(
Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
r?
0 −Φ1 0 1


dP˜
dK˜
dλ¯
dB˜
 =

0
dGN
dGT
0
 (73)
The determinant denoted by D of the matrix of coefficients is given by:
D ≡ hkkk
N
P
µ
{(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)(
Y Tλ¯ − CTλ¯
)−(Y Nλ¯
µ
− CNλ¯
)[
Y TK + r
?Φ1
]}
(74)
We have to consider two cases, depending on wether the non-traded sector is more or
less capital intensive than the traded sector:
D = −ν1ν2
P˜ λ¯
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
> 0, if kT > kN , (75a)
D = −ν1ν2
P˜ λ¯
{(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
)2}
> 0,(75b)
if kN > kT ,
where we used the fact that and fkN−PhkT =W (kN − kT ) together with−P [kNν2 + kT (ν1 + δK)] ≡
W if kT > kN or −P [kNν1 + kT (ν2 + δK)] ≡W if kN > kT .
41In the traded sector which is perfectly competitive, we have : Y T = FLL
T + rKKT = WLT + rKKT .
Instead, in the non-traded sector which is imperfectly competitive we have: PZN = P HL
µ
LN +P HK
µ
KN or
PµZN = PY N = PHLL
N + PHKK
N =WLN + rKKN .
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D.1 A Permanent Rise in GT
Case kN > kT
If kN > kT , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GT are:
dC˜
dGT
=
σCC˜
P˜ λ¯
ν1ν2
D
< 0, (76a)
dλ¯
dGT
= −ν1ν2
P˜D
> 0, (76b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (76c)
dK˜
dGT
=
ν1
P˜ λ¯D
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)
≶ 0, (76d)
dB˜
dGT
= Φ1
dK˜
dGT
≷ 0. (76e)
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GT are:
dC˜
dGT
= − σCC˜(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) < 0, (77a)
dλ¯
dGT
=
λ¯(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) > 0, (77b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (77c)
dK˜
dGT
=
(
σLL˜k˜
T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) > 0, (77d)
dB˜
dGT
= −
P˜
(
σLL˜k˜
T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) < 0. (77e)
D.2 A Permanent Rise in GN
Case kN > kT
If kN > kT , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GN are:
dC˜
dGN
=
σCC˜
λ¯
ν1ν2
D
[
1 +
r?
ν2
ω12
P˜ ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
)]
< 0, (78a)
dλ¯
dGN
= −ν1ν2
D
[
1 +
r?
ν2
ω12
P˜ ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
)]
> 0, (78b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (78c)
dK˜
dGN
=
ν1
λ¯DP˜
(
σLL˜k˜
N P˜ ν1 − σCC˜T
)
> 0, (78d)
dB˜
dGN
= − ν1
λ¯DP˜
(
σLL˜k˜
N P˜ ν1 − σCC˜T
){
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
< 0,(78e)
Case kT > kN
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If kT > kN , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GN are:
dC˜
dGN
= − σCC˜P˜(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) < 0, (79a)
dλ¯
dGN
=
λ¯P˜(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) > 0, (79b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (79c)
dK˜
dGN
= −
(
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν2 − σCC˜T
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) ≶ 0, (79d)
dB˜
dGN
=
P˜
(
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν2 − σCC˜T
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) ≷ 0. (79e)
D.3 Rewriting the Long-Run Effects
In this subsection, we rewrite expressions of steady-state changes (78) following a permanent
fiscal expansion, i.e. after a rise in GN , when kN > kT . To begin with, it is useful to
introduce some notations:
Ψ˜ =
[
σLL˜k˜
T (ν2 + δK)− σCC˜N
]
≷ 0, (80)
where Ψ˜ > 0 if labor supply is elastic enough.
kN > kT
Using notation (80), determinant D given by (75b) can be rewritten as follows:
D ≡ −ν1ν2
P˜ λ¯
[(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+
r?ω12
(ν2)
2 Ψ˜
2
]
> 0. (81)
If kN > kT , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GN are:
dλ¯
dGN
= −
λ¯
[
P˜ − r?ω12
(ν2)
2 Ψ˜
]
[(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+ r
?ω12
(ν2)
2 Ψ˜2
] > 0, (82a)
dK˜
dGN
= −
(
σLL˜k˜
N P˜ ν1 − σCC˜T
)
ν2
[(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+ r
?ω12
(ν2)
2 Ψ˜2
] > 0, (82b)
D.4 Impact Effects
This section estimates the impact effects of a permanent fiscal expansion. The stable
adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path in (K,P )-space. The capital
stock, the real exchange rate, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:
K(t) = K˜ +B1eν1t, (83a)
P (t) = P˜ + ω12B1e
ν1t, (83b)
B(t) = B˜ +Φ1B1eν1t, (83c)
where ω12 = 0, Φ1 = −P˜ if kT > kN and with
B1 = K0 − K˜ = −dK˜,
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where we used the fact that K is initially predetermined, i.e., K(0) = K0.
We derive below the initial reactions of investment and the current account.
kN > kT
Differentiating (364a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, and substituting (82b), the
initial response of investment is:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ν1 dK˜dGN =
ν1
(
σLL˜P˜ k˜
T ν1 − σCC˜T
)
ν2
[(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+ r
?ω12
(ν2)
2
(
Ψ˜
)2] > 0. (84)
Using the fact that Φ1 = −P˜ , the initial reaction of the current account is:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −Φ1ν1 dK˜dGN = −
(
P˜ − ω
1
2
ν2
Ψ˜
)
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
,
where we used the notation Ψ˜ given by eq. (80) to rewrite Φ1 given by (69).
kT > kN
Differentiating (364a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, and substituting (79d), the
initial response of investment is:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ν1 dK˜dGN =
(
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν2 − σCC˜T
)
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) ≷ 0. (85)
Using the fact that Φ1 = −P˜ , the initial reaction of the current account is:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= P˜ ν1
dK˜
dGN
= −P˜ dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
≶ 0.
E Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case
of Inelastic Labor Supply
In this section, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by assuming
that labor supply is inelastically supplied.
We have to consider two cases, depending on whether the non-traded sector is more or
less capital intensive than the traded sector :
D = −ν1ν2PCC˜σC
P˜ λ¯
> 0, if kT > kN , (86a)
D = −ν1PCC˜σC
P˜ λ¯
[
ν2 + αc
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
> 0, if kN > kT . (86b)
The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (86b) is positive if the following
inequality holds
ν2 > −αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2. (87)
From (35f), this inequality is satisfied since αC
r?
ν2
< 1.
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E.1 Long-Run Effects of a Rise in GT
Case kN > kT
dC˜
dGT
= − 1
P˜c
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (88a)
dλ¯
dGT
=
αC λ¯
σC P˜ C˜N
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (88b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (88c)
dL˜T
dGT
=
αC
P˜ h˜
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (88d)
dK˜
dGT
= − αC
P˜ ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (88e)
dB˜
dGT
=
αC
ν2
[
1 + 1ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0. (88f)
Case kT > kN
dC˜
dGT
= − 1
P˜c
< 0, (89a)
dλ¯
dGT
=
αC λ¯
σC P˜ C˜N
> 0, (89b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (89c)
dL˜T
dGT
=
αC
P˜ h˜
> 0, (89d)
dK˜
dGT
= − αC
P˜ ν1
> 0, (89e)
dB˜
dGT
=
αC
ν1
< 0. (89f)
E.2 Long-Run Effects of a Rise in GN
Case kN > kT
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dC˜
dGN
= − P˜
P˜C
[
1 + r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (90a)
dλ¯
dGN
=
αcλ¯
σCC˜N
[
1 + r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (90b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (90c)
dL˜T
dGN
= − (1− αC)
h˜
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (90d)
dK˜
dGN
=
(1− αC)
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (90e)
dB˜
dGN
= −
P˜ (1− αC)
[
1 + 1ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0. (90f)
Case kT > kN
dC˜
dGN
= − P˜
P˜C
< 0, (91a)
dλ¯
dGN
=
αcλ¯
σC P˜ C˜N
> 0, (91b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (91c)
dL˜T
dGN
= −(1− αC)
h˜
< 0, (91d)
dK˜
dGN
=
(1− αC)
ν1
< 0, (91e)
dB˜
dGN
= − P˜ (1− αC)
ν1
> 0. (91f)
F Derivation of Formal Solutions after Temporary Fiscal
Shocks with Inelastic Labor Supply
In this section, we provide the main steps to derive formal solutions for key variables after
temporary fiscal shocks, by applying the procedure developed by Schubert and Turnovsky
[2002]. For simplicity purpose, we assume that µ = 1 and δK = 0 since our objective is to
derive transitional dynamics analytically.
F.1 Steady-State
As in Schubert and Turnovsky [2002], we define a viable steady-state i starting at time Ti
to be one that is consistent with long run solvency, given the stocks of capital, KTi and
foreign bonds, BTi . We rewrite the system of steady-state equations for an arbitrary period
14
i (with i = 0, 1, 2):
hk
[
k˜N
(
P˜i
)]
= r?, (92a)
Y N
(
K˜i, P˜i
)
− C˜Ni −GNi = 0, (92b)
r?B˜i + Y T
(
K˜i, P˜i
)
− C˜Ti −GTi = 0, (92c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition(
B˜i −BTi
)
= Φ1
(
K˜i −KTi
)
. (92d)
F.2 Steady-State Functions
The new consistent procedure consists in two steps. In a first step, we solve the sys-
tem (92a)-(92c) for P˜i, K˜i and B˜i as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, λ¯i, the
government expenditure on the traded and non-traded goods, i.e. GT and GN . Totally
differentiating equations (92a)-(92c) yields in matrix form: hkkkNP 0 0(Y NP − CNP ) Y NK 0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
?
 dP˜idK˜i
dB˜i
 =
 0P ′CCλ¯dλ¯i + dGNi
(1− αC)PCCλ¯dλ¯i + dGTi
 (93)
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth λ¯i and fiscal policy parameters,
GTi , G
N
i , determine the following steady-state values:
P˜i = constant, (94a)
K˜i = K
(
λ¯i, G
N
i
)
, (94b)
B˜i = B
(
λ¯i, G
T
i , G
N
i
)
, (94c)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜i
∂λ¯i
=
hkkk
N
P PCP
′
Cr
?
G
= −σC C˜
N
i
λ¯i
(
k˜Ni − k˜Ti
)
h˜i
≶ 0, (95a)
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜i
∂λ¯i
=
hkkk
N
P PC
(−P ′CY TK + (1− αC)PCY NK )
G
,
=
PCC˜i
λ¯i
σC
Y NK r
?
αCr? − h˜i(
k˜Ni − k˜Ti
)
 ,
= −PCC˜i
λ¯i
σC
r?P˜ h˜i
[
αC f˜i + (1− αC) P˜ih˜i
]
< 0, (95b)
and
KGT ≡
∂K˜i
∂GTi
= 0, (96a)
BGT ≡
∂B˜i
∂GTi
=
1
r?
> 0, (96b)
and
KGN ≡
∂K˜i
∂GNi
=
hkkk
N
P uccr
?
G
=
(
k˜Ni − k˜Ti
)
h˜i
≷ 0, (97a)
BGN ≡
∂B˜i
∂GNi
= −hkkk
N
P uccY
T
K
G
=
f˜i
h˜i
1
r?
> 0, (97b)
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where G ≡ hkkkNP uccY NK r? which simplifies as follows :
G ≡ f˜ h˜
P˜ 2
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2uccr? < 0. (98)
The second step consists to determine the equilibrium change of λ¯i by taking the total
differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (92d):
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ] dλ¯i = dBTi − Φ1dKTi − [BGN − Φ1KGN ] dGNi −BGT dGTi , (99)
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯i as a function of initial stocks at time
Ti and government spending:
λ¯ = λ
(
KTi , BTi , G
T , GN
)
, (100)
with
λK ≡ ∂λ¯i
∂KTi
= − Φ1
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
< 0, (101a)
λB ≡ ∂λ¯i
∂BTi
=
1
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
< 0, (101b)
λGT ≡
∂λ¯i
∂GTi
= − BGT
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
> 0, (101c)
λGN ≡
∂λ¯i
∂GNi
= − [BGN − Φ1KGN ]
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
> 0. (101d)
From (101), we obtain the following properties:
λB [Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯] = 1, (102a)
λBBGT = −λGT , (102b)
λB [BGN − Φ1KGN ] = −λGN . (102c)
F.3 Formal Solutions for Temporary Fiscal Shocks
We assume that the small open economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, denoted
by the subscript i = 0:
K0 = K˜0 = K
(
λ¯0, G
N
0
)
= K
(
λ
(
K0, B0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
, GN0
)
, (103a)
B0 = B˜0 = B
(
λ¯0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
= B
(
λ
(
K0, B0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
, GT0 , G
N
0
)
, (103b)
λ0 = λ¯0 = λ
(
K0, B0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
. (103c)
We suppose now that government expenditure changes unexpectedly at time t = 0 from
the original level GT0 (resp. G
N
0 ) to level G
T
1 (resp. G
N
1 ) over the period 0 ≤ t < T , and
reverts back at time T permanently to its initial level, GTT = GT2 = GT0 (resp. GNT = GN2 =
GN0 ).
Period 1 (0 ≤ t < T )
Whereas the fiscal expansion is implemented, the economy follows unstable transitional
paths:
K(t) = K˜1 +B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (104a)
P (t) = P˜1 + ω12B1e
ν1t + ω22B2e
ν2t, (104b)
B(t) = B˜1 +
[(
B0 − B˜1
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +
+Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (104c)
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with the steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 given by the following functions (set i = 1 into
(94b)-(94c)):
K˜1 = K
(
λ¯, GN1
)
, (105a)
B˜1 = B
(
λ¯, GT1 , G
N
1
)
, (105b)
where the marginal utility of wealth remains constant over periods 1 and 2 at level λ¯1 =
λ¯2 = λ¯ after its initial jump at time t = 0.
Period 2 (t ≥ T )
Once government spending reverts back to its initial level, the economy follows stable
paths
K(t) = K˜2 +B′1e
ν1t, (106a)
P (t) = P˜2 + ω12B
′
1e
ν1t, (106b)
B(t) = B˜2 +Φ1B′1e
ν1t, (106c)
with the steady-state values K˜2 and B˜2 given by the following functions (set i = 2 into
(94b)-(94c)):
K˜2 = K
(
λ¯, GN2
)
, (107a)
B˜2 = B
(
λ¯, GT2 , G
N
2
)
. (107b)
During the transition period 1, the economy accumulates capital and foreign assets.
Since this period is unstable, it would lead the nation to violate its intertemporal budget
constraint. By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable and must
satisfy the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the zero-root
problem requires the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth to adjust once-and-
for-all when the shock hits the economy. So λ remains constant over the periods 1 and 2.
The aim of the two-step method is to calculate the deviation of λ such that the country
satisfies one single and overall intertemporal budget constraint, given the new relevant
initial conditions, KT and BT , prevailing when the shock ends and accumulated over the
unstable period. Therefore, for the country to remain intertemporally solvent, we require:
BT − B˜2 = Φ1
(
KT − K˜2
)
. (108)
In order to determine the three constants B1, B2, and B′1, and the equilibrium value of
marginal utility of wealth, we impose three conditions:
1. Initial conditions K(0) = K0, B(0) = B0 must be met.
2. Economic aggregates K and P remain continuous at time T .
3. The intertemporal solvency constraint (108) must hold implying that the net foreign
assets remain continuous at time T .
Set t = 0 in solution (104a), and evaluating first at time t = T , equate (104a) and
(106a), (104b) and (106b):
K˜1 +B1 +B2 = K0, (109a)
K˜1 +B1eν1T +B2eν2T = K˜2 +B′1e
ν1T , (109b)
P˜1 + ω12B1e
ν1T + ω22B2e
ν2T = P˜2 + ω12B
′
1e
ν1T , (109c)
where we used the continuity condition.
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Evaluating KT and BT from respectively (104a) and (104c), substituting into (108),
and using functions of steady-state values K˜i and B˜i given by (103) (for i = 0), (105) (for
i = 1), and (107) (for i = 2), the intertemporal solvency condition can be rewritten as
B
(
λ¯, GT1 , G
N
1
)
+
[ (
B
(
λ0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)−B (λ¯, GT1 , GN1 ))− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2]er?T +Φ1B1eν1T
+Φ2B2eν2T −B
(
λ¯, GT2 , G
N
2
)
= Φ1
[
K
(
λ¯, GN1
)
+B1eν1T +B2eν2T −K
(
λ¯, GN2
)]
. (110)
Then, we approximate the steady-state changes with the differentials:
K˜1 − K˜0 ≡ K
(
λ¯, GN1
)−K (λ0, GN0 ) = Kλ¯dλ¯+KGNdGN , (111a)
K˜2 − K˜1 ≡ K
(
λ¯, GN2
)−K (λ¯, GN1 ) = −KGNdGN , (111b)
B˜1 − B˜0 ≡ B
(
λ¯, GT1 , G
N
1
)−B (λ0, GT0 , GN0 ) = Bλ¯dλ¯+BGT dGT +BGNdGN ,(111c)
B˜2 − B˜1 ≡ B
(
λ¯, GT2 , G
N
2
)−B (λ¯, GT1 , GN1 ) = −BGT dGT −BGNdGN , (111d)
where dλ¯ ≡ λ¯− λ0.
By substituting these expressions in (109) and (110), we obtain finally
B1 +B2 = −Kλ¯dλ¯−KGNdGN , (112a)
B1e
ν1T +B2eν2T −B′1eν1T = −KGNdGN , (112b)
ω12B1e
ν1T + ω22B2e
ν2T − ω12B′1eν1T = 0, (112c)
and
B1Υ1 +B2Υ2 +Bλ¯dλ¯ = Ω1, (113)
where we set
Υ1 ≡ Φ1, (114a)
Υ2 ≡ Φ2 + (Φ1 − Φ2) e−ν1T , (114b)
Ω1 ≡
[(
vgj − Φ1Kgj
)
e−r
?T − vgj
]
dgj j = T,N, (114c)
where KGT = 0.
Case kN > kT
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We write out some useful expressions
Kλ¯ = −
C˜N
λ¯
σC
ν2
< 0, (115a)
KGN =
1
ν2
> 0, (115b)
Bλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
ν2r?
[(1− αC) ν2 − αCν1] < 0, (115c)
BGN = −
P˜ ν1
ν2r?
> 0, (115d)
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯) = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
ν2r?
[
ν2 + αC
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
< 0, (115e)
(BGN − Φ1KGN ) =
P˜
ν2r?
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
> 0, (115f)
Υ2 = −P˜
[
1 +
C˜N
P˜
σC
ν2
ω12e
−ν1T
]
, (115g)
Bλ¯ −Υ2Kλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?ν2
[
ν2 + αC
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2e
−ν1T
]
< 0, (115h)
Ω1Kλ¯ +Bλ¯KGNdG
N = −PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r? (ν2)
2
{
αC
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
e−r
?T + (1− αC) ν2
}
dGN < 0,
(115i)
and BGT = 1/r? > 0. We used the fact that k˜T ν2 + k˜Nν1 = −WP˜ and the following
expression:
Ω1 = − 1
r?
(
1− e−r?T
)
dGT +
P˜
r?ν2
{
ν1 +
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
e−r
?T
}
dGN . (116)
Case kT > kN
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We write out some useful expressions
Kλ¯ = −
C˜N
λ¯
σC
ν1
> 0, (117a)
KGN =
1
ν1
< 0, (117b)
Bλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
ν1r?
[(1− αC) ν1 − αCν2] < 0, (117c)
BGN = −
P˜ ν2
ν1r?
> 0, (117d)
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯) = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?
< 0 (117e)
(BGN − Φ1KGN ) =
P˜
r?
> 0, (117f)
Υ2 = −P˜
[
1 +
C˜N
P˜
σC
ν1
ω22
(
1− e−ν1T )] < 0, (117g)
Bλ¯ −Υ2Kλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?ν1
[
ν1 + αC
r?
ν1
C˜N
P˜
σCω
2
2
(
1− e−ν1T )] ≷ 0,(117h)
Ω1Kλ¯ +Bλ¯KGNdG
N = −PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?ν1
[
(1− αC) + αCe−r?T
]
> 0, (117i)
and BGT = 1/r? > 0. We used the fact that k˜T ν1 + k˜Nν2 = −WP˜ and the following
expression:
Ω1 = − 1
r?
(
1− e−r?T
)
dGT +
P˜
r?ν1
(
ν2 + ν1e−r
?T
)
dGN . (118)
Case kN > kT
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:
B1
dGT
=
αC
(
1− e−r?T )
P˜ ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (119a)
B2
dGT
= 0, (119b)
B′1
dGT
=
B1
dGT
, (119c)
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (119d)
where, from (112a),
B1
dGT
can be written also as follows
B1
dGT
= −Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
. (120)
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non-traded good are given
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by:
B1
dGN
= −
[(
1− e−ν2T )− αC (1− e−r?T )]
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
= −(1− αC)
(
1− e−ν2T )+ αC (e−r?T − e−ν2T )
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (121a)
B2
dGN
= −e
−ν2T
ν2
< 0, (121b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
< 0, (121c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
1− e−ν2T ) dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+
uccP˜
(PC)
2
ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
= λGN
(1− e−ν2T )− ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
 ≶ 0, (121d)
where we used expression (90b) to obtain (121d). From (112a),
B1
dGT
and
B2
dGT
can also be
written as follows:
B1
dGN
+
B2
dGN
= −Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KGN and
B2
dGN
= −KGN e−ν2T . (122)
Case kT > kN
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:
B1
dGT
=
αC
ν1P˜
(
1− e−r?T
)
< 0, (123a)
B2
dGT
= 0, (123b)
B′1
dGT
=
B1
dGT
, (123c)
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (123d)
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non-traded good are given
by:
B1
dGN
= − 1
ν1
[
(1− αC) + αCe−r?T
]
,
= − 1
ν1
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
> 0, (124a)
B2
dGN
= 0, (124b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
+KGN e
−ν1T
= − 1
ν1
[(
1− e−ν1T )− αC (1− e−r?T )] < 0, (124c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (124d)
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G Transitional Dynamics after a Rise in GN
In this section, we investigate in details the dynamics of key variables after a permanent
and temporary rise in GN , considering both cases: kT > kN and kN > kT . Transitional
paths are depicted in Figures 2 and 4 for kT > kN and kN > kT , respectively. To keep
analytical tractability, we assume that labor supply is fixed, i.e. we set σL = 0. Since these
two parameters do no affect qualitatively the results, we further assume that the non-traded
sector is perfectly competitive, i.e. we set µ = 1, and we set the rate of depreciation of
physical capital to zero.
G.1 Long-Run Effects
We derive the ultimate steady-state changes of the economic key variables after a permanent
rise in government spending on the non-traded good by differentiating the functions (94)
w.r.t GN :
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (125a)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+KGN ≷ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT ,(125b)
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+BGN ≶ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT , (125c)
where analytical expressions are given by the set of equations (90) and (91).
We turn now to the long run changes of macroeconomic aggregates after a temporary
fiscal expansion by considering two cases.
Case kN > kT
The equilibrium change of λ¯ is:
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(1− e−ν2T )− ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
 < 0. (126)
The sign of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth can be
determined by noticing that eq. (126) tends towards zero if we let T tend towards zero and
tends towards λGN if we let T tend towards ∞. In addition, the term in square brackets
is an increasing and monotonic function of parameter T . Therefore, the change in λ¯ after
a temporary rise in government spending lies in the range [0, λGN ]. Consequently, we can
deduce that expression (126) has a positive sign.
Using the functions (94), we deduce the long run changes for the real consumption, the
stock of physical capital, and the stock of traded bonds:
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (127a)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (127b)
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (127c)
where Cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ < 0, and Bλ¯ < 0.
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The change of the period 1 steady-state value K˜1 compared to its initial (given) value
K˜0 is given by:
dK˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+KGN ,
=
(1− αC) + αC
[
1 + r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2e
ν1T
]
e−r?T
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (128)
where we have substituted expressions of Kλ¯ < 0 given by (115a),
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣
temp
> 0 given by
(126) and KGN > 0 given by (115b).
The change of the period 1 steady-state value B˜1 compared to its initial (given) value
B˜0 is given by:
dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGN , (129)
= − P˜
r∗ν2
1[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]{ ((1− αC) ν2 − αCν1)[1 + r?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
](
1− e−r?T
)
+
[
1 + αC
r?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
ν1
}
≷ 0,
where we have substituted expressions of Bλ¯ < 0 given by (115c),
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0 given by
(126) and BGN > 0 given by (115d). We cannot sign eq. (129) because it is the result of
two opposite effects. The first term on the RHS of (129) is negative and is an increasing
function of parameter T and may be dominated by the second term BGN which is positive.
We can infer that the shorter-lasting the rise in government expenditure, the more likely a
higher steady-state value B˜1 compared to its initial (given) value B˜0.
It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long run changes in the stock of
international assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+BGN R Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
, (130)
where BGN > 0, Bλ¯ < 0 and
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= λGN > 0. The key factor that determines the
magnitude of the long run change in the stock of foreign assets is the period of implemen-
tation of the government policy. More specifically, simulations indicate that there exists
a time T = T´ for which the two changes are equal. For high durations of the policy, i.
e. T > T´ , the deterioration of the net foreign asset position features a greater magnitude
after a temporary fiscal expansion compared to a permanent policy. This result is reversed
when the public policy is implemented over a short period, say T < T´ .
From steady-state changes following permanent and temporary rise in government ex-
penditure on the non-traded good, we can deduce the following inequalities regardless of
the length of the shock:
K˜temp < K0 < K˜perm < K˜1, (131a)
B˜temp < B˜perm < B0, if T > T´ , (131b)
B˜perm < B˜temp < B0, if T < T´ . (131c)
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Case kT > kN
The equilibrium change of λ¯ is:
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (132)
From (132), we see that that the change of λ after a temporary change in GN is smaller
than that after a permanent increase in GN but goes in the same direction. Hence we
deduce the following inequality:
0 <
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
<
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
. (133)
From (94), we deduce steady-state changes of consumption, the stock of physical capital,
and the stock of traded bonds:
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (134a)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0, (134b)
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (134c)
where Cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ > 0, and Bλ¯ < 0.
Changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 compared to their initial (given)
values K0 and B0 are given by :
dK˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+KGN ,
=
(1− αC) + αCe−r?T
ν1
< 0, (135a)
dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGN ,
= − P˜
r?ν1
{
(1− αC) r? − [(1− αC) ν1 − αCν2] e−r?T
}
> 0, (135b)
where we have evaluated the signs of (135a)-(135b) by making use of (117a)-(117d) and
(91b).
From (133), because the change in the equilibrium value of λ¯ following a temporary
change in GN is smaller than that after a permanent increase in GN , by making use of
(134b)-(134c), (125b)-(125c), and (135a)-(135b), we are able to deduce the following in-
equalities:
K˜1 < K˜perm < K0 < K˜temp, (136a)
B˜temp < B0 < B˜perm < B˜1. (136b)
G.2 Transitional Dynamics after a Permanent Increase in GN
Case kN > kT
The initial jump of P is obtained by setting t = 0 in (104b) and by differentiating with
respect to GN :
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0. (137)
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From the short run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium value
of the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of the relative price of the non-traded
good, we get the initial jump of consumption:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ CP
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −
P˜
[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
− C˜NσCω12
PC
[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
=
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+
(1− αC)
PC
C˜NσCω
1
2[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0. (138)
From (138), we deduce the following inequality
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (139)
The rise in the marginal utility of wealth and the initial appreciation in the relative price of
the non-traded good lowers C(0) below its steady-state value. Along the stable adjustment,
real consumption rises:
C˙(t) = −CσCαC P˙ (t)
P (t)
> 0, (140)
where the relative price of the non-traded good depreciates along the stable adjustment
when the non-traded sector is relatively more capital intensive. Otherwise, the relative
price of the non-traded good’s and thus the real consumption’s temporal paths are flat.
The dynamics of the key economic variables after a permanent rise in government spend-
ing falling on the non-traded good are as follows:
K˙(t) = −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN > 0, (141a)
P˙ (t) = −ν1ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN < 0, (141b)
B˙(t) = −ν1Φ1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN < 0. (141c)
Note that the long run changes of K˜ and B˜ are opposite to those after a permanent rise
GT .
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the initial change in the real consumption is solely affected by the change
in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and jumps immediately to its new
lower steady-state level:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
=
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (142)
Over time, investment decreases and the stock of international assets rises:
I(t) = −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN < 0, (143a)
CA(t) = −ν1Φ1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN > 0. (143b)
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As will be useful later, we calculate the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal
expansion in the (K,B)-space by differentiating the solutions for B(t) and for K(t) w.r.t
time:
dB(t)
dK(t)
=
ν1Φ1 B1dGN e
ν1t
ν1
B1
dGN e
ν1t
= −P˜ < 0. (144)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = −P˜ .
G.3 Transitional Dynamics after a Temporary Increase in GN
Case kN > kT
First, we evaluate the constants B1/dGN and B2/dGN :
B1
dGN
= − B2
dGN
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KGN ,
= − dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
< 0. (145a)
B2
dGN
= −KGN e−ν2T = −
e−ν2T
ν2
< 0. (145b)
By evaluating the formal solution for P (t) at time t = 0, differentiating with respect to
GN , and remembering that dP˜1/dGN = 0, we get the initial jump of P :
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ω12
B1
dGN
= −ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−ν2T )− ω12αC (e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
= −ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
> 0,(146)
where we have inserted the steady-state change of the capital stock after a permanent fiscal
expansion falling on the non-traded good given by (90e). From (146), we can see that the
magnitude of the initial appreciation in the real exchange after a temporary fiscal expansion
may be magnified if the policy is implemented during a long period, i. e. for T > 1ν1 ln [αC ].
By making use of the short run static solution (26) for C, we obtain the response of real
consumption at time t = 0:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ CP
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0. (147)
It is now convenient to evaluate the magnitude of the downward jump of real consumption
after a temporary rise in GN compared with that after a permanent fiscal expansion by
computing the following expression:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
[
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
]
+CP
[
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
]
≷ 0. (148)
(149)
From (148), we deduce the following inequality:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0. (150)
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The initial response of the investment flow following a temporary rise in GN is given by:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
+ ν2
B2
dGN
= −ν1
(1− αC)
(
1− e−ν2T )+ αC (e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
− e−ν2T ,
= −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
− e−ν2T ≷ 0.(151)
The sign of expression (151) is not clear-cut. As investment plays the role of clearing the
non-traded goods market, its sign depends on the jumps of the relative price of the non-
traded good and of the marginal utility of wealth. On the one hand, the relative price of
the non-traded good appreciates which raises the return on domestic capital by reducing
kN . On the other hand, the increase in P raises the capital user cost. The latter effect is
larger, the shorter-living the fiscal shock.
To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of investment af-
ter a temporary rise in GN , we first linearize the non-traded good market clearing condition
in the neighborhood of the steady-state:
I(t)− I˜ = Y NK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
(
Y NP − CNP
) (
P (t)− P˜
)
.
Using the fact that dI˜ = Y NK dK˜+
(
Y NP − CNP
)
dP˜ −CN
λ¯
dλ¯
∣∣
temp
−dGN , and evaluating the
expression above at time t = 0, we get:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Y NP − CNP
) dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ σC
C˜N
λ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1. (152)
Using the fact that dP˜ = 0, we evaluate the initial jump of P which is given by:
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ω12
dB1
dGN
= −ω12
[
KGN
(
1− e−ν2T )+Kλ¯ dλ¯dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= ω12
[
−
(
1− e−ν2T )
ν2
+
σC
ν2
C˜N
λ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
, (153)
where we substituted KGN = 1/ν2 and Kλ¯ = −σCν2 C˜
N
λ¯
. Substituting (153) into (152) and
using the fact that ω12 =
ν1−ν2
(Y NP −CNP )
, the initial reaction of investment finally rewrites as:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
ν2 − ν1
ν2
)(
1− e−ν2T )+ σCC˜N
λ¯
ν1
ν2
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1. (154)
By differentiating the formal solution (104c) over period 1 for B(t) with respect to time,
then evaluating the resulting expressions at t = 0, and differentiating with respect to GN ,
we obtain the initial response of the current account following a temporary fiscal expansion:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
{
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2
B2
dGN
}
+ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
+ ν2Φ2
B2
dGN
. (155)
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In order to simplify the solution (155), we rewrite the term in square brackets as follows
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−
[
Φ1
B1
dGN
+Φ2
B2
dGN
]
= − [Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− [BGN − Φ1KGN ] + [Φ1 − Φ2]
B2
dGN
,
= −λGN
λB
(1− e−ν2T )− ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
+ λGNλB + 1ν2 C˜NσCω12KGN e−ν2T ,
=
λGN
λB
eν2T − P˜
r?
e−r
?T +
P˜
ν2r?
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
e−ν2T ,
= − P˜
r?
e−r
?T < 0, (156)
where we have substituted the expression of the change in the equilibrium value of the
marginal utility of wealth given by (121d), we made use of properties (102), expression
(115f) and inserted these useful expressions:
B1
dGN
= − B2
dGN
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KGN < 0,
Φ1 − Φ2 = − 1
ν2
C˜NσCω
1
2 > 0,
B2
dGN
= −KGN e−ν2T < 0,
(BGN − Φ1KGN )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] = P˜
ν2r?
> 0.
By inserting (156) into (155), the expression of the initial response of the current account
reduces to:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1P˜
(
1 +
1
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
−P˜ e−r?T + P˜ e−ν2T ,
= −P˜
(
1 +
1
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
−P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
< 0, (157)
where we simplified several expressions as follows:
Kλ¯
uCC P˜
P 2C
ν2 =
P˜ C˜N
PCC˜
= αC > 0,
ν2Φ2 − ν1Φ1 = −P˜ ν2 + P˜ ν1
(
1 +
1
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
< 0.
To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of the current
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account after a temporary rise in GN , we use eq. (145a):
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
+ ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
,
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
− ν1Φ1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
,
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
−ν1Φ1 (1− αC)
ν2
(
1− αCΨ˜
) [(1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
< 0, (158)
where 0 < Ψ˜ ≡ − r?
ν22
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2 < 1.
Now, we investigate the dynamics for K(t) and P (t) over the unstable period (0, T ),
say period 1:
K˙(t) = ν1
B1
dGN
eν1tdGN + ν2
B2
dGN
eν2tdGN R 0, (159a)
P˙ (t) = ν1ω12
B1
dGN
eν1tdGN < 0, (159b)
where B1/dGN < 0, B2/dGN < 0, and ω12 < 0. As it can be seen from (159a), investment
dynamics are the result of two opposite forces. If the initial investment flow is positive, it
must be negative at time t˜ along the trajectory:
t˜ =
1
ν1 − ν2 ln
[
−ν2B2/dG
N
ν1B1/dGN
]
, (160)
where the term in square brackets is less than one under the condition that the initial
investment flow is positive (see eq. (151)), otherwise the trajectory for investment is mono-
tonic.
The current account dynamics over period 1 are described by the following equation:
CA(t) =
[
P˜ e−ν2(T −t)
(
1− e−ν1(T −t)
)
+ ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
eν1t
]
dGN < 0. (161)
We turn now to the analysis of transitional dynamics over the stable period 2. By
making use of standard methods, the adjustments of the stock of physical capital, the
relative price of non tradables P and the stock of international assets are driven by the
following equations:
K˙(t) = ν1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t > 0, (162a)
P˙ (t) = ν1ω12
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t < 0, (162b)
B˙(t) = ν1Φ1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t < 0. (162c)
Evaluate (162c) at time t+, and calculate dCA (T ) = CA (T +) − CA (T −), we can
see that the current account is continuous in the neighborhood of time T . Thus we have
CA (T −) = CA (T +). Performing the same procedure of investment, we obtain:
dI (T )
dGN
= −ν2 B2dGN e
ν2T = 1. (163)
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When the policy is removed at time T , i. e. government spending falls by an amount
equals to dGN (T ) ≡ GN2 − GN1 ≡ −dGN , investment must rise to guarantee that the
market-clearing condition holds at time T .
Case kT > kN
Like after a permanent fiscal expansion, an unexpected transitory rise in government
spending on the non-traded good leaves unaffected the relative price of the non-traded
good both in the short run and in the long run. To evaluate the investment dynamics,
we differentiate the solution for K(t) given by (104a) with respect to time, evaluate the
resulting expression at time t = 0, and then differentiate with respect to GN , keeping in
mind that B2/dGN = 0 if kT > kN :
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
= −ν1 1
ν1
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
,
= αC
(
1− e−r?T
)
− 1 < 0,
=
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
− e−r?T < 0. (164)
Applying standard methods, the initial response of the current account following a
temporary fiscal expansion on the non-traded good is given by:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
{
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN
}
+ ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
,
= P˜ (1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (165)
where ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
= P˜
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
.
In deriving (165), we have also simplified the term in square braces as follows:
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN
= −
{[
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ (BGN − Φ1KGN )
]}
,
=
λGN
λB
e−r
?T = − P˜
r?
e−r
?T < 0. (166)
We investigate the dynamics of the stocks of physical capital and traded bonds by taking
the time derivative of formal solutions prevailing over period 1:
I(t) = K˙(t) = ν1
B1
dGN
dGNeν1t,
= −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
dGNeν1t − e−r?T dGNeν1t < 0, (167)
and
CA(t) = −r?
[(
n
(
λ¯, GN1
)−B (λ0, GN0 ))+Φ1 B1dGN
]
dGNer
?t + ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
dGNeν1t,
= P˜
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
eν1t − e−r?T
(
er
?t − eν1t
)]
dGN ≷ 0. (168)
There exists a time t = t´ such that the current account changes of sign:
t´ = − 1
ν2
ln
[
e−r?T
(1− αC) (1− e−r?T ) + e−r?T
]
, (169)
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where the term in square brackets is positive and lower than one. Over period 1, the
current account improves first while the negative investment flow more than outweighs
the smoothing effect. At time t´, these two effects cancel each other and after this date, the
current account deteriorates as the smoothing behavior predominates, such that CA (T −) <
0. To see it more formally, we evaluate (168) at time T −:
CA
(
T−
)
= P˜ eν1T
[(
1− e−ν1T )− αC (1− e−r?T )]dGN < 0. (170)
At time T −, the investment flow is also negative:
I
(T −) = −e−ν2T [1− (1− αC)(1− er?T )] < 0. (171)
We have now to compare the slope of the trajectory after a transitory fiscal expansion over
period 0 ≤ t < t´ in the (K,B)-space with the slope of the trajectory after a permanent
fiscal expansion:
dB(t)
dK(t)
=
−P˜ e−r?(T −t) + ν1Φ1 B1dGN eν1t
ν1
B1
dGN e
ν1t
,
= − P˜
{[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T )+ e−r?T ] eν1t − e−r?(T −t)}
[(1− αC) (1− e−r?T ) + e−r?T ] eν1t , (172)
where we have substituted the expression of the constant B1/dGN . Over period 0 ≤ t´ < t,
the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative. Thus the slope of the trajectory
is negative in the (K,B)-space. Comparing the terms in numerator and in denominator
of (172), it is straightforward to show that the slope in absolute terms is lower than P˜ .
Therefore, the slope is negative and lower (in absolute terms) than the slope of the trajectory
after a permanent fiscal expansion (equal to −P˜ ).
We turn now to the investigation of transitional dynamics of key macroeconomic vari-
ables over the stable period, say period 2. By adopting the standard procedure, we get:
I(t) = K˙(t) = ν1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t > 0 (173a)
CA(t) = B˙(t) = ν1Φ1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t < 0. (173b)
Since the period 2 is a stable period, the dynamics are monotonic. If we can determine
the sign of (173) at time t = T +, we are able to evaluate the transitional dynamics over
the entire period:
I
(T +) = − [(1− αC) (eν1T − e−ν2T )− (1− e−ν2T )]dGN > 0, (174a)
CA
(T +) = P˜ [(1− αC) (eν1T − e−ν2T )− (1− e−ν2T )]dGN < 0. (174b)
From (170) and (174b), we deduce that the current account is continuous in the neighbor-
hood of T , such that CA (T −) = CA (T +) < 0. At the opposite, from (171) and (174a),
we see that investment is not continuous in the neighborhood of T since at this date, it
must clear the non tradable market. To see it formally, we write the non tradable clearing
market condition at time T − and at time T +:
I
(
T−
)
= Y N
[
K
(T −) , P (T −)]− CN [λ (T −) , P (T −)]−GN1 < 0, (175a)
I
(T +) = Y N [K (T +) , P (T +)]− CN [λ (T +) , P (T +)]−GN2 > 0, (175b)
where GN2 = G
N
0 . Goods market equilibrium is subject to two discrete perturbations: one
at time t = 0 when the government raises the public spending, the other at time t = T when
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Figure 2: Permanent Vs. Temporary Increase in Gj - kT > kN
the policy is permanently removed. Since capital is a predetermined variable, it cannot jump
neither at time t = 0 or at time t = T . In addition, the marginal utility of wealth jumps at
time t = 0 and remains constant from thereon. So we get λ¯ = λ (T −) = λ (T +). Finally,
when the tradable good sector is relatively more capital intensive, a rise in government
spending leaves unaffected the relative price of the non-traded good both in the sort-run
and in the long run, such that P˜ = P (T −) = P (T +). With output constrained at time T
by the capital stock and by the relative price of the non-traded good, it therefore follows
from (175) that for the market-clearing condition to hold, we must have
dI (T ) = dK˙ (T ) = −dGN (T ) = dGN > 0, (176)
where dGN (T ) ≡ GN2 − GN1 ≡ GN0 − GN1 ≡ −dGN . Thus, the non-traded goods market
equilibrium is maintained though the investment in physical capital, K˙ (T ). Since at time
T , government expenditure reverts back to its original level, the investment flow changes
of sign and turns out to be positive as a greater share of the non tradable production (Y N )
may be allocated to investment (I) since the global consumption (CN +GN ) falls.
H Transitional Dynamics after a Rise in GT
In the text, we consider only an increase in GN . In this section, we analyze the effects
of an increase in GT . Hence, we provide details on the dynamics of key variables after
a permanent and temporary rise in GT , considering both cases: kT > kN and kN > kT .
Transitional paths are depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for kT > kN and kN > kT , respectively.
To keep analytical tractability, we assume that labor supply is fixed, i.e. we set σL = 0.
Since these two parameters do no affect qualitatively the results, we further assume that
the non-traded sector is perfectly competitive, i.e. we set µ = 1, and we set the rate of
depreciation of physical capital to zero.
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H.1 Long-Run Effects
It is convenient to determine first the long run changes of the real consumption, the stock
of physical capital and the stock of foreign assets following a permanent rise in government
spending on the traded good by differentiating (26) and (94):
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (177a)
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
≶ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT , (177b)
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+BGT ≷ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT , (177c)
where CGT = 0 and KGT = 0. Expressions of the steady-state changes are given by the set
of equations (88) and (89).
We compare the once-for-all jump of the marginal utility of wealth after a permanent
increase in public spending on the traded good with respect to its change after a permanent
rise:
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
= λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (178)
We now evaluate the long run changes of key economic variables after a temporary fiscal
shock by differentiating (26) and (94). Since the signs of expressions depend crucially on
the sectoral capital intensities, we consider two cases.
Case kN > kT
When the non-traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroe-
conomic aggregates in the long run are given by:
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (179a)
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (179b)
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (179c)
where Cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ < 0 (if k
N > kT ), and Bλ¯ < 0.
The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 compared to their initial
(given) values K0 and B0 are given by :
dK˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (180a)
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT > 0, (180b)
where Kλ¯ < 0, Bλ¯ < 0 and BGT > 0. From (177b)-(177c), (179b)-(179c), and (180a)-
(180b), we are able to deduce the following inequalities:
K˜perm < K˜1 = K˜temp < K0, (181a)
B˜temp < B0 < B˜perm < B˜1. (181b)
Case kT > kN
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When the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroeco-
nomic aggregates in the long run are given by
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (182a)
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0, (182b)
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (182c)
It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long run changes in the stock of
international assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯λGT +BGT R Bλ¯λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
=
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
. (183)
The key factor that determines the magnitude of the long run change in the stock of foreign
assets is the period of implementation of the government policy. More specifically, there
exists a time T = T˜ for which the two changes are equal which is given by
T˜ = 1
r?
ln
[
−Bλ¯λGT
BGT
]
. (184)
As the fiscal shock is more persistent, i. e. T > T˜ , the external asset position deteriorates
more than after a permanent fiscal shock. We can summarize our results as follows:
B˜temp < B˜perm < B0 if T > T˜ , (185a)
B˜perm < B˜temp < B0 if T < T˜ . (185b)
The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 compared to their initial
(given) values K˜0 and B˜0 are given by :
dK˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0, (186a)
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT ≷ 0, (186b)
where Kλ¯ > 0, Bλ¯ < 0 and BGT > 0. The sign of (186b) is indeterminate but we are able
to determine the length of fiscal shock, denoted by T¯ , for which the steady-state change
(186b) is equal to zero:
T¯ = − 1
r?
ln
[
Bλ¯λGT +BGT
Bλ¯λGT
]
. (187)
The existence of time T¯ relies upon inequality Bλ¯λGT < Bλ¯λGT + BGT < 0 which in turn
implies that the term in square brackets is positive and less than unity. Consequently, we
get the following inequality:
B˜1 ≶ B0 depending on whether T ≷ T¯ . (188)
From (177b)-(177c), (182b)-(182c), (185) and (186a)-(186b), we are able to deduce the
following inequalities:
K0 < K˜1 = K˜temp < K˜perm, (189a)
B˜perm < B˜temp < B0 if T < T˜ , (189b)
B˜temp < B˜perm < B˜0 if T > T˜ , (189c)
where we assume that T˜ < T¯ .
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H.2 Transitional Dynamics after a Permanent Increase in GT
As shown previously, the stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path
in (K,P )-space. The capital stock, the relative price of the non-traded good, and the stock
of traded bonds evolve according to:
K(t) = K˜ +B1eµ1t, (190a)
P (t) = P˜ + ω12B1e
µ1t, (190b)
B(t) = B˜ +Φ1B1eµ1t, (190c)
where ω12 = 0 if k
T > kN and with
B1 = K0 − K˜ = − dK˜dGT dG
T ,
where we made use of the constancy of K at time t = 0 (i. e. K0 is predetermined).
Case kN > kT
Using the fact that the steady-state value of the relative price of the non-traded good
remains affected by a permanent rise in GT , the initial jump of P is given by
dP (0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ω12
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (191)
From the short run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium
value of the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of P , we get the response of real
consumption at time t = 0:
dC(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ CP
dP (0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −
[
1 + αC 1µ2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
PC
[
1 + αC r
?
(µ2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] ,
=
[
1 + αC
1
µ2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (192)
where 0 <
[
1 + αC 1µ2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
< 1. Therefore, we deduce the following inequality
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dC(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (193)
Irrespective of sectoral capital intensities, a rise in GT induces a once-for-all upward jump
of the marginal utility of wealth which reduces real consumption. If kN > kT , the initial
fall of C is moderated by the depreciation in P at time t = 0 and falls by less than in the
long run.
Differentiating solutions (190), with respect to time, one obtains:
K˙(t) = −µ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT < 0, (194a)
P˙ (t) = −µ1ω12
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT > 0, (194b)
B˙(t) = −µ1Φ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT > 0, (194c)
where Φ1 < 0 and
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0.
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Along the stable adjustment, real consumption decreases:
C˙ = −σCCαC P˙
P
< 0, (195)
where
(
r? − αC P˙
P
)
corresponds to the consumption-based real interest rate. After its
initial depreciation, the relative price of the non-traded good appreciates to revert back to
its initial value. This appreciation lowers the consumption-based real interest rate below
the world interest rate which stimulates real consumption.
Case kT > kN
Differentiating solutions (190), with respect to time, one obtains
K˙(t) = −µ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT > 0, (196a)
P˙ (t) = 0, (196b)
B˙(t) = −µ1Φ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT < 0, (196c)
where Φ1 < 0 and
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0.
H.3 Transitional Dynamics after a Temporary Increase in GT
Case kN > kT
By evaluating formal solution for P (t) and differentiating with respect to GT , we get
the initial jump of P
dP (0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −ω12
(
1− e−r?T
) dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (197)
By adopting a similar procedure, we obtain the initial response of the investment flow
following a temporary rise in government spending on the traded good :
dI(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
1− e−r?T
) dI(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (198)
By differentiating the formal solution (104c) over period 1 for B(t) with respect to time,
remembering that B2/dGT = 0, then evaluating this at t = 0, and differentiating with
respect to GT , we obtain the initial response of the current account following a fiscal
expansion:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −r?
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
+ µ1Φ1
B1
dGT
.
The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (102), and the fact that
BGT = −λGT /λB:
−
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
= −
[
Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT − Φ1Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= −
[
λGT
λB
(
1− e−r?T
)
− λGT
λB
]
,
= −BGT e−r
?T . (199)
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Inserting this expression, and remembering that
dB˜
dGT
= Φ1
dK˜
dGT
, we obtain the reaction of
the current account at time t = 0:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −e−r?T − µ1Φ1Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
)
λGT ,
= −e−r?T − µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
≶ 0. (200)
The initial current account response is the result of two conflictory forces: (i) a smoothing
effect which deteriorates the current account, and (ii) the negative investment flow which
improves the external asset position. From (200), there exists a critical value of shock’s
length, Tˆ > 0, such that the current account response is zero on impact, i. e. B˙ (0) = 0.
Solving (200) for Tˆ , we get:
Tˆ = 1
r?
ln

1− µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
−µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
 , (201)
where the term in square brackets is higher than one.
The dynamics for K and P over period 1 are derived by taking the time derivative of
equations (104a) and (104b):
K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT = −µ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT < 0, (202a)
P˙ (t) = µ1ω12
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT = −ω12µ1
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT > 0, (202b)
where we used the fact that B1/dGT = − dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
.
While the P and K go in the same direction as after a permanent rise in GT , differenti-
ation with respect to time of eq. (104c) shows that the current account may change of sign
over period 1:
CA(t) = B˙(t) = −e−r?(T −t)dGT − µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT ≶ 0. (203)
We have now to determine the conditions under which the current account dynamics dis-
plays a non monotonic behavior. Equation (203) reveals that the stock of international
assets reaches a turning point during its transitional adjustment at time Tˆ given by
Tˆ = 1
µ2
ln
[
−µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
er
?T
]
. (204)
The necessary condition for Tˆ > 0, corresponds to:
0 < e−r
?T < −µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
⇔ dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0. (205)
If the fiscal expansion lasts a short period, i. e. T < Tˆ , the current account initially
deteriorates and the stock of foreign assets decreases monotonically until time T . If the
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fiscal expansion lasts a time period longer than Tˆ , the current account initially improves
before reaching a turning point at time Tˆ . Subsequently, the current account deteriorates
until time T .
Once the government policy has been removed at time T , the relative price of the non-
traded good keeps on depreciating and the capital stock converges towards its new lower
steady-state value:
K˙(t) = µ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT < 0, (206a)
P˙ (t) = µ1ω12
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT > 0, (206b)
whereB′1/dGT = B1/dGT > 0. Over period 2, the current account improves unambiguously
as it can be seen from the time derivative of solution (106c):
B˙(t) = µ1Φ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT > 0. (207)
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the dynamics for P are flat as after a permanent fiscal expansion since the
constant B2/dGT is zero, i.e. P˙ (t) = 0. The investment flow is positive over period 1
I(t) = K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT = −µ1Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
eµ1tdGT > 0. (208)
Differentiating eq. (104c) with respect to time and remembering that B2/dGT = 0 yields
the transitional path for B(t):
CA(t) = −r?
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
er
?tdGT + µ1Φ1
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT . (209)
By evaluating this expressions at t = 0, and differentiating with respect to GT , we obtain
the initial response of the current account following a fiscal expansion:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −r?
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
+ µ1Φ1
B1
dGT
.
The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (102), and the fact that
BGT = −λGT /λB:
−
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
= −
[
Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT − Φ1Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= −
[
λGT
λB
(
1− e−r?T
)
− λGT
λB
]
,
= −BGT e−r
?T . (210)
Inserting expression (210) and remembering that
dB˜
dGT
= Φ1
dK˜
dGT
, we obtain the reaction
of the current account at time t = 0:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −e−r?T − µ1Φ1Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
)
λGT ,
= −
[
e−r
?T + µ1
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)]
< 0. (211)
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If kT > kN , both the smoothing effect and the positive investment flow lead to a decumula-
tion of foreign assets. Consequently, the current account deteriorates initially and the stock
of internationally traded bonds keeps on decreasing over period 1:
CA(t) = B˙(t) = −e−r?(T −t)dGT − µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT < 0. (212)
Over period 2, the stocks of physical capital keeps on decreasing and the current account
deteriorates monotonically:
I(t) = µ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT > 0, (213a)
CA(t) = µ1Φ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT < 0, (213b)
where B′1/dGT = B1/dGT < 0.
I The Effects of Temporary Fiscal Shocks: The Case of Elas-
tic Labor Supply
In this section, we derive formal solutions by assuming elastic labor supply. We consider a
traded sector alternatively more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector.
We first solve the system (72a)-(72c) for P˜ , K˜ and B˜ as functions of the marginal utility
of wealth, λ¯ and government spending GN . Totally differentiating equations (72a)-(72c)
yields in matrix form: 
hkkk
N
P
µ 0 0(
Y NP
µ − CNP
) (
Y NK
µ − δK
)
0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
?

 dP˜dK˜
dB˜

=

0
−
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − CNλ¯
)
dλ¯+ dGN
− (Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
dλ¯
 . (214)
Steady-state values of K and B can be expressed as functions of the shadow value of
wealth and government spending GN :
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (215a)
B˜ = B
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (215b)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= −
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − CNλ¯
)
(
Y NK
µ − δK
) , (216a)
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜
∂λ¯
=
Y TK
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − CNλ¯
)
−
(
Y NK
µ − δK
) (
Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
r?
(
Y NK
µ − δK
) . (216b)
(216c)
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We sign expressions depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital
intensive than the non-traded sector:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)
]
> 0 if kT > kN , (217a)
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
≷ 0 if kN > kT , (217b)
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜
∂λ¯
=
{
σC
(
P˜ C˜Nν2 − C˜T ν1
)
+ ν2P˜ σLL˜
[
k˜Nν1 − k˜T (ν1 + δK)
]}
r?ν1λ¯
< 0, if kT > kN ,(217c)
=
{
σC
(
P˜ C˜Nν1 − C˜T ν2
)
+ ν1P˜ σLL˜
[
k˜Nν2 − k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
r?ν2λ¯
< 0, if kN > kT ,(217d)
and
KGN ≡
∂K˜
∂GN
=
1
Y NK
µ − δK
=
1
ν1
< 0 if kT > kN , (218a)
=
1
Y NK
µ − δK
=
1
ν2
> 0 if kN > kT , (218b)
BGN ≡
∂B˜
∂GN
= − Y
T
K(
Y NK
µ − δK
)
r?
= − P˜ ν2
r?ν1
> 0, if kT > kN , (218c)
= − Y
T
K(
Y NK
µ − δK
)
r?
= − P˜ ν1
r?ν2
> 0, if kN > kT . (218d)
(218e)
Adopting the same procedure as described in section K.7, we derive formal expressions
below for constants B1, B2 and B′1 when kT > kN . We were unable to derive useful formal
expressions with the reversal of capital intensities. Yet, in the latter case, analytical results
derived by assuming inelastic labor supply are in line with numerical results and thereby
elastic labor supply does not affect qualitatively the results.
Case kT > kN
The solutions after a rise in GN are:
B1
dGN
= −
[
σC
(
P˜ C˜Ne−r?T + C˜T
)
− σLL˜P˜
(
ν2k˜
N + (ν1 + δK) k˜T e−r
?T
)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ,
= −
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+
(
1− e−r?T ) P˜ (σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ≷ 0, (219a)
B2
dGN
= 0, (219b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
+KGN e
−ν1T
= −
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) (
1− e−ν1T )+ (1− e−r?T ) P˜ (σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ≷ 0,(219c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (219d)
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where λGN represents the change in the equilibrium value of the shadow value of wealth
after a permanent increase in GN (see eq. (79b)).
General solutions for K and P are:
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (220a)
P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (220b)
Differentiating eq. (220a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating w.r.t.
GN , we obtain the initial response of investment following a temporary rise in government
spending on the non-traded good:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
+ ν2
B2
dGN
.
Substituting (219a) and using the fact that B2dGN = 0, the initial reaction of investment is:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −ν1
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+
(
1− e−r?T ) P˜ (σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ,
= −
1 + (1− e−r?T )
[
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
]
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0. (221)
Eq. (221) corresponds to eq. (24) in the text. Since the length of the shock T plays a
key role in driving the initial response of investment, it is useful to determine the critical
length Tˆ such that when T < Tˆ , government spending crowds out investment. Investment
falls when
−
1 + (1− e−r?T )
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 < 0,
e−r
?T > 1 +
[
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
]
[
σLL˜k˜T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
] ,
T < − 1
r?
ln

(
σCC˜
T − σLL˜k˜N P˜ ν2
)
(
σLL˜k˜T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
)
 = Tˆ ,
where we used the fact that W˜+P˜ k˜T (ν1 + δK) = −P˜ k˜Nν2. The term in brackets in positive
but smaller than one. When T is smaller than the critical length Tˆ , then investment is
crowded-out by public spending.
The general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:
B(t) = B˜ +
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (222)
Differentiating eq. (222) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating w.r.t.
GN , we obtain the initial response of the current account after a temporary rise in GN :
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
[
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2
B2
dGN
]
+ ν1
B1Φ1
dGN
+ ν2
B2Φ2
dGN
.
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Using the fact that
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2
B2
dGN
= −
[
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ (BGN − Φ1KGN )
]
,
=
λGN
λB
e−r
?T = − P˜
r?
e−r
?T , (223)
the initial reaction of the current account can be rewritten as follows:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −P˜ e−r?T − ν1P˜ B1dGN ,
= P˜
(
1− e−r?T
)1 +
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0,
= −P˜ e−r?T + P˜
1 + (1− e−r?T )
[
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
]
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0,(224)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = −P˜ . Eq. (224) corresponds to eq. (25) in the text.
Case kN > kT
While we are unable to derive full expressions for temporary shocks if the non traded
sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector when considering elastic labor sup-
ply, we are able to provide useful (i.e., interpretable) expressions which are included and
discussed in the text. Below, we provide details about the derivations of these useful ex-
pressions.
The solutions after a rise in GN are:
B1
dGN
= − B2
dGN
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KGN = −
(
1− e−ν2T )
ν2
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
,(225a)
B2
dGN
= −e
−ν2T
ν2
, (225b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
, (225c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
+
(Φ1 − Φ2)
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )
ν2 (Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
> 0, (225d)
where we computed the following relationship to sign (225d)
Φ1 − Φ2 = −ω
1
2
ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
< 0. (226)
The sign of (226) holds when labor supply is elastic enough (i.e., for plausible values of σL).
Using the fact that 1(Bλ¯−Φ1Kλ¯) =
λ
GN
(BGN−Φ1KGN )
, eq. (225d) can be rewritten as follows:
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
{(
1− e−r?T
)
− (Φ1 − Φ2)
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )
ν2 (BGN − Φ1KGN )
}
> 0,
= λGN
{(
1− e−r?T
)
− r
? (Φ1 − Φ2)
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )
ν2P˜ − r? (Φ1 − Φ2)
}
> 0, (227)
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where BGN − Φ1KGN is given by
BGN − Φ1KGN =
P˜
r?
+
ω12
(ν2)
2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
,
=
P˜
r?
− Φ1 − Φ2
ν2
> 0.
To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of investment
after a temporary rise in GN , we proceed as in section G. Hence, we first linearize the
non-traded good market clearing condition in the neighborhood of the steady-state:
I(t)− I˜ = Y
N
K
µ
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
(
Y NP
µ
− CNP
)(
P (t)− P˜
)
.
Using the fact that dI˜ = Y
N
K
µ dK˜ +
(
Y NP
µ − CNP
)
dP˜ +
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − CNλ¯
)
dλ¯
∣∣
temp
− dGN , and
evaluating the above expression at time t = 0, we get:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Y NP
µ
− CNP
)
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
λ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−1. (228)
Using the fact that dP˜ = 0, we evaluate the initial jump of P which is given by:
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ω12
dB1
dGN
= −ω12
[
KGN
(
1− e−ν2T )+Kλ¯ dλ¯dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= ω12
−(1− e−ν2T )
ν2
+
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
λ¯ν2
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
 ,(229)
where we substitutedKGN = 1/ν2 andKλ¯ = − 1λ¯ 1ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
(see (217b)).
Substituting (229) into (228), using the fact that ω12 =
ν1−ν2(
Y N
P
µ
−CNP
) , and collecting terms,
the initial reaction of investment can be rewritten as:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
ν2 − ν1
ν2
)(
1− e−ν2T )+ ν1
ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
λ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1.
(230)
By differentiating the formal solution for foreign assets over period 1 for B(t) with
respect to time, then evaluating the resulting expression at t = 0, and differentiating with
respect to GN , we obtain the initial response of the current account following a temporary
fiscal expansion:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
{
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2
B2
dGN
}
+ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
+ ν2Φ2
B2
dGN
. (231)
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In order to simplify the solution (231), we rewrite the term in square brackets as follows
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−
[
Φ1
B1
dGN
+Φ2
B2
dGN
]
= − (Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− (BGN − Φ1KGN ) + [Φ1 − Φ2]
B2
dGN
,
= − (Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
{
λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
+
(Φ1 − Φ2)
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )
ν2 (Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
}
− (BGN − Φ1KGN )−
(Φ1 − Φ2)
ν2
e−ν2T ,
= −(Φ1 − Φ2)
ν2
e−r
?T − (BGN − Φ1KGN ) e−r
?T ,
= − P˜
r?
e−r
?T < 0, (232)
where we have computed the following expression to get (232):
(BGN − Φ1KGN ) =
P˜
r?
+
ω12
(ν2)
2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
> 0. (233)
Inserting (232) into (231), the initial response of the current account can be rewritten as
follows:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −P˜ e−r?T − ν1
{
P˜ +
ω12
ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]} B1
dGN
+ ν2Φ2
B2
dGN
,
= −P˜ e−r?T − ν1
ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
ω12
B1
dGN
− P˜
(
ν1
B1
dGN
+ ν2
B2
dGN
)
,
= −P˜ e−r?T − ν1
ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
] dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− P˜ dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
, (234)
where dP (0)dGN
∣∣
temp
is given by (229) and dI(0)dGN
∣∣
temp
is given by (230). To get (234), we used
the fact that dI(0)dGN
∣∣
temp
= ν1 B1dGN + ν2
B2
dGN .
J Savings
Since the current account can be alternatively expressed as net exports plus interest earnings
from traded bond holding, or as the savings less investment, we provide details for the
derivation of steady-state and dynamic effects of fiscal shocks on savings.
J.1 Formal Solution for Financial Wealth
The law of motion for financial wealth (S(t) = A˙(t)) is given by:
A˙(t) = r?A(t) +W (P )L
(
λ¯, P
)− PC (P )C (λ¯, P )− Z, (235)
with Z = GT + PGN .
The linearized version of (235) is:
A˙(t) = r?
(
A(t)− A˜
)
+M
(
P (t)− P˜
)
, (236)
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with M given by
M =
(
WP L˜+ W˜LP
)
−
(
C˜N + PCCP +GN
)
,
= L˜WP (1 + σL)−
[
C˜N (1− σC) +GN
]
,
= −
{
K˜ (ν2 + δK) +
[
σLL˜k˜
T (ν2 + δK)− σCC˜N
]}
< 0. (237)
From the second line of (237), if σC < 1 as empirical studies suggest, then the term
in square brackets is positive and M is negative. The last line has been computed by
using the fact that L˜ = L˜N + L˜T and K˜ = k˜T L˜T + k˜N L˜N which allows to simplify
1
µ
[
Y˜ N + L˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)µ
]
to K˜ (ν2 + δK).
The general solution for the stock of financial wealth is given by:
A(t) = A˜+
[(
A0 − A˜
)
− Mω
1
2
ν1 − r?B1 −
Mω22
ν2 − r?B2
]
er
?t +
Mω12
ν1 − r?B1e
ν1t +
Mω22
ν2 − r?B2e
ν1t.
(238)
Invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the stable solution for financial wealth:
A(t) = A˜+
Mω12
ν1 − r?B1e
ν1t, (239)
and the intertemporal solvency condition
A˜−A0 = Mω
1
2
ν1 − r?
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (240)
J.2 Steady-State and Dynamic Effects of a Permanent Fiscal Shock
Differentiating (240) w. r. t. Gi (i = T,N), long-term changes of financial wealth are given
by:
dA˜
dGi
=
ω12
ν2
(
K˜ν2 + σLL˜k˜T ν2 − σCC˜N
) dK˜
dGi
. (241)
Differentiating (239) w. r. t. Gi (i = T,N), we get the dynamics of savings:
S(t) = A˙(t) = ν1
Mω12
ν1 − r?
B1
dGi
dGieν1t, (242)
where B1dGi = −
dK˜
dGi .
J.3 Steady-State and Dynamic Effects of a Temporary Fiscal Shock
We now evaluate the transitional dynamics of saving after a temporary shock, dGi (i =
T,N).
Case kN > kT
Over the unstable period 1, savings evolve as follows:
S(t) = A˙(t) = r?
[(
A0 − A˜1
)
− Mω
1
2
ν1 − r?B1
]
er
?t + ν1
Mω12
ν1 − r?B1e
ν1t, (243)
with (
A0 − A˜1
)
=
(
B0 − B˜1
)
+ P˜0
(
K0 − K˜1
)
+K0
(
P0 − P˜1
)
. (244)
Over the stable period 2, savings evolve as follows:
S(t) = A˙(t) = ν1
Mω12
ν1 − r?B
′
1e
ν1t. (245)
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To compute steady-state changes of the stock of financial wealth, we linearize A(t) =
B(t) + P (t)K(t) in the neighborhood of the final steady-state. We have:
A(t)− A˜2 =
(
B(t)− B˜2
)
+ P˜
(
K(t)− K˜2
)
+ K˜
(
P (t)− P˜2
)
.
Then we evaluate at time t = 0:
A0 − A˜2 =
(
B0 − B˜2
)
+ P˜0
(
K0 − K˜2
)
+ K˜0
(
P (0)− P˜2
)
,
where we used the fact that A(0) = A0, B(0) = B0, K(0) = K0 and assumed that the small
open economy starts initially from the steady-state, i. e. A0 = A˜0 = A˜, B0 = B˜0 = B˜,
K0 = K˜0 = K˜. Substituting P (0)−P˜2 = ω12B1 into the expression above and differentiating
w.r.t Gi (i = T,N), long-term changes of financial wealth are given by:
dA˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (246a)
dA˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (246b)
with (
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
)
= −σCPCC˜
λ¯r?
< 0. (247)
Case kT > kN
Since ω12 = 0 whenever the traded good sector is relatively more capital intensive, and
because B2/dGi = 0, the transitional dynamics for saving degenerate and the financial
wealth jumps immediately to its new steady-state level.
Adopting a similar procedure than previously (i. e. in the case kN > kT ), we can
calculate the long-term changes of financial wealth as follows:
dA˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (248a)
dA˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (248b)
with
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯ = −
σCPCC˜
λ¯r?
< 0. (249)
K The Case of Endogenous Markup
The framework builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]. While we consider the case of an
endogenous markup, the framework is identical to that with a fixed markup, except that
in the latter case the number of competitors is large enough so that the price-elasticity of
demand is not affected by firm entry. There are two sectors in the economy: a perfectly
competitive sector which produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T and an im-
perfectly competitive sector which produces a non-traded good denoted by the superscript
N . We assume that each producer of a unique variety of the non-traded good has the
following technology XNj = H (Kj ,Lj) where Kj is the capital stock and Lj is labor.
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K.1 Framework
The final non-traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-
returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral
non-traded goods:
Y N =
[∫ 1
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 , (250)
where ω > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral
goods and QNj stands for intermediate consumption of sector’j variety (with j ∈ [0, N ]).
The final good producers behave competitively, and the households use the final good for
both consumption and investment.
In each of the j sectors, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are
aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good by a CES aggregating function. The non-traded
output sectoral good j is given by:42
QNj = N−
1
²−1
[∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di] ²²−1 , (251)
where XNi,j stands for output of firm i in sector j and ² is the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties.
Denoting by P and Pj the relative price of the final good and of the jth variety of the
intermediate good, respectively, the profit the final good producer is written as follows:
ΠN = P
[∫ N
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 − ∫ 1
0
PjQNj dj. (252)
Total cost minimizing for a given level of final output gives the (intratemporal) demand
function for each input:
QNj =
(Pj
P
)−ω
Y N , (253)
and the price of the final output is given by:
P =
(∫ 1
0
P1−ωj dj
) 1
1−ω
, (254)
where Pj is the price index of sector j and P is the price of the final good.
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one
variety XNi,j is a price setter. Intermediate output XNi,j is produced using capital KNi,j and
labor LNi,j :
XNi,j = H
(KNi,j ,LNi,j) . (255)
Denoting by Pi,j the price of good i in sector j, the profit function for the jth sector
good producer denoted by piNj is:
piNj ≡ PjN−
1
²−1
(∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di) ²²−1 − ∫ N
0
Pi,jXNi,jdi. (256)
The demand faced by each producer XNi,j is defined as follows:
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−² QNj
N
, (257)
42By having the term N−
1
²−1 in (251), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates
solely on the effects of markup variation.
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and the price index of sector j is given by:
Pj = N−
1
1−²
(∫ N
0
P1−²i,j di
) 1
1−²
. (258)
Combining (253) and (257), the demand for variety XNi,j can be expressed in terms of
the relative price of the final non-traded good:
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−²(Pj
P
)−ω Y N
N
. (259)
In order to operate, each intermediate good producer must pay a fixed cost denoted by
FC measured in terms of the final (non-traded) good which is assumed to be symmetric
across firms. Each firm j chooses capital and labor to maximize profits. The profit function
for the ith producer in sector j denoted by piNi,j is:
piNi,j ≡ PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj −WLNj − PFC. (260)
The demands for capital and hours worked are given by the equalities of the markup-
adjusted marginal revenues of capital PjHKµ and labor
PjHL
µ , to the capital rental rate r
K
and the producer wage W , respectively.
K.2 First-Order Conditions
The current-value Hamiltonian for the j-th firm’s optimization problem in the non-traded
sector is:
HNj = PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj −WLNj − pFC + ηj [H (KNj ,LNj )−XNi,j] , (261)
where XNj stands for the demand for variety j; firm j chooses its price Pj to maximize
profits treating the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for are:
PjHK + ηHK = rK , , (262a)
PjHL + ηHL = W, (262b)
ηj = P ′jHj , (262c)
Combining (316a)-(316b) with (316c), by assuming that firms j are symmetric, yields:
PjHK
(
1− 1
ej
)
= rK , (263a)
PjHL
(
1− 1
ej
)
=W, (263b)
where we used the fact that
P ′j
PjXNi,j
= − 1ej .
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate good sector
produce the output level XNi,j = XN with the same quantities of labor LNi,j = LN and
capital KNi,j = KN . Hence, the aggregate stock of physical capital and hours worked are
KN = NKN and LN = NLN , respectively. They also set the same price Pi,j = P. Hence,
eqs. (254) and (258) imply that P = P .
Remembering that the markup is given by µ = ee−1 , first-order conditions can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
P
HK
µ
= rK , (264a)
P
HL
µ
=W. (264b)
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We follow Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] by taking into
account the influence of the individual price on the sectoral price index:
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (265)
As will be useful later, we calculate the partial derivatives of the price-elasticity of
demand and the markup with respect to the number of firms:
eN =
∂e
∂N
=
²− ω
N2
> 0, µN =
∂µ
∂N
= − eN
(e− 1)2 = −
eN
e− 1
µ
e
< 0, (266)
where we let µ = ee−1 .
We further assume that free entry drives profits down to zero in all industries of the
non-traded sector at each instant of time. Using constant returns to scale in production,
i. e. X = H (K,L) = HKK + HLL, and the zero profit condition, in the aggregate, we
have:
PH
(
KN , LN
)− rKKN −WLN − PNFC = 0. (267)
Substituting the short-run static solution for non-traded output (36), the zero-profit con-
dition (267) can be rewritten as:
Y N
(
K,P, λ¯, µ (N)
)(
1− 1
µ (N)
)
= NFC. (268)
K.3 Short-Run Static Solution for the Number of Firms
The zero profit condition can be solved for the number of producers in the non-traded
sector:
N = N
(
K,P, λ¯
)
, (269)
where partial derivatives are given by:
Nx ≡ ∂N
∂x
= −Y
N
x ωFC
χ
≷ 0, (270)
where x = K,P, λ¯, ωFC ≡ NFC/Y N corresponds to the share of fixed costs in markup-
adjusted output and we set
χ =
Y N
N
{[
ηY N ,µ (µ− 1) + 1
] ηµ,N
µ
− ωFC
}
. (271)
Inspection of (271) shows that χ < 0 if ηµ,N is not too large. This implies that an input
inflow in the non-traded sector that raises Y N and thereby yields to profit opportunities
results in firm entry which lowers the markup.
K.4 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions for non-traded output and consumption, given by (36)
and (28) respectively, into the non-traded good market-clearing condition (12), and inserting
short-run static solution for capital-labor ratio in the non-traded good sector (30) into the
dynamic equation for the real exchange rate (5d), and substituting the short-run static
solution for the number of firms (269) yields:
K˙ =
Y N {K,P, µ [N (K,P )]}
µ [N (K,P )]
− CN (P )− δKK −GN , (272a)
P˙ = P
{
r? + δK −
hk
(
kN {P, µ [N (K,P )]})
µ [N (K,P )]
}
. (272b)
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For clarity purpose, we dropped variables which are constant over time from short-run
static solutions.
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting by x˜ = K˜, P˜ the
steady-state values of x = K,P , we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, P˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, P (t)− P˜
)T
, (273)
where J is given by
J ≡
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
, (274)
where elements evaluated at the steady-state are:
b11 =
Y N
µ
[
Y NK
Y N
− µN
µ
NK
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)]
− δK , (275a)
b12 =
Y N
µ
[
Y NP
Y N
− µN
µ
NP
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)]
− CNP , (275b)
b21 =
P
µ
hkk
µNNK
µ
kN
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)
, (275c)
b22 = −P
µ
hkk
[
kNP −
µNNP
µ
kN
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
. (275d)
Equilibrium Dynamics
The sign of the determinant denoted by Det of the 2 × 2 Jacobian matrix (274) is
ambiguous:
Det J = b11b22 − b12b21
=
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)[
Y TK
P˜
+
P
µ
hkkk
N µNNp
µ
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
−µN
µ
NK
[
Y N
µ
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)
Y TK
P˜
+
(
Y NP
µ
− CNP
)
P
µ
hkkk
N
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
,(276)
and the trace denoted by Tr is given by:
Tr J = b11 + b22 =
Y TK
µ
+
Y NK
P
− δK
−µN
µ
[
NK
Y N
µ
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)
−NP P
µ
hkkk
N
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
,
= r? − µN
µ
NK
Y N
µ
> 0, (277)
where we used the fact that Y
T
K
µ +
Y NK
P =
hk
µ = r
? + δK ; the positive sign follows from
NK > 0 and µN < 0. If the elasticity of the markup to the flow of entry is not too large,
then determinant (276) is negative so that the condition for saddle-path stability with real-
valued roots holds. Such a condition requires that the markup must be initially not too
large.
Characteristic roots from J write as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{
Tr J±
√
(Tr J)2 − 4Det J
}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (278)
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We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (279)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, P , the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
General solutions are those described by (52) with eigenvector ωi2 associated with eigen-
value µi given by:
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
. (280)
K.5 Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
Inserting first short-run static solutions for Y T and CT given by (36) and (28), respectively,
substituting the short-run static solution for the number of firms given by (269), into eq.(3),
and linearizing around the steady-state gives:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
+
[
Y TK + Y
T
µ µNNK
] (
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[(
Y TP + Y
T
µ µNNP
)− CTP ] (P (t)− P˜) ,
(281)
where CTP is given by (29b).
Using the fact that P (t)− P˜ = ω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, setting
N1 =
[
Y TK + Y
T
µ µNNK
]
+
[(
Y TP + Y
T
µ µNNP
)− CTP ]ω12, (282)
solving for the differential equation and invoking the transversality condition for intertem-
poral solvency, the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
B(t)− B˜ = Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, (283)
and the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
B˜ −B0 = Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
, (284)
where we used the fact that B1 ≡ K0 − K˜.
K.6 Solutions for L, N , and W
Linearizing the short-run static solution N = N (K,P ) yields the solution for the number
of firms:
N(t) = N˜ +NK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+NP
(
P (t)− P˜
)
,
= N˜ +
(
NK +NPω12
)
B1e
ν1t +
(
NK +NPω22
)
B2e
ν2t. (285)
Linearizing the short-run static solution for labor L = L (P, µ), using the fact that
µ = µ (N), and substituting the appropriate solutions, the solution for L(t) reads:
L(t) = L˜+ LP
(
P (t)− P˜
)
+ Lµ (µ(t)− µ˜) , (286)
= L˜+ LP
[
ω12 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω12
)]
B1e
ν1t + LP
[
ω22 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω22
)]
B1e
ν2t,(287)
where we used the fact that Lµ = −LPPµ .
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Linearizing the short-run static solution for the wage rate W =W (P, µ) and substitut-
ing appropriate solutions yields:
W (t) = W˜ +WPω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+WµµN
(
N(t)− N˜
)
,
= W˜ +WP
[
ω12 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω12
)]
B1e
ν1t +WP
[
ω22 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω22
)]
B2e
ν2t,(288)
where we used the fact that Wµ = −WPPµ .
K.7 The Two-Step Procedure: Wealth Effect and Government Spending
By analytical convenience, we rewrite the system of steady-state equations, assuming that
δK = 0:
hk
[
kN
(
P˜ , µ˜
)]
µ˜
= r?, (289a)
1
µ˜
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GN = 0, (289b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GT = 0, (289c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition(
B˜ −B0
)
= Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
, (289d)
where K0 and B0 correspond to the initially predetermined stocks of physical capital and
foreign assets, and µ˜ = µ
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
.
Derivation of Steady-State Functions
In a first step, we solve the system (289a)-(289c) for P˜ , K˜ and B˜ as functions of the
marginal utility of wealth, λ¯, government spending GN together with the mark-up. Totally
differentiating equations (289a)-(289c) yields in matrix form:
hkkk
N
P
µ 0 0(
Y NP
µ − CNP
) (
Y NK
µ − δK
)
0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
?

 dP˜dK˜
dB˜

=

Y NK
µ dµ
−
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − CNλ¯
)
dλ¯+ Y
N
µ2
(
1 + PY
N
P
Y N
+ 1
)
dµ+ dGN
− (Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
dλ¯− Y Tµ dµ
 , (290)
where we used the fact that µf = P
[
h− hk
(
kN − kT )] and hkµ = r? at the steady-state to
rewrite r? − hkkkNµ as h˜µ(k˜N−k˜T ) =
Y NK
µ , and −
(
Y Nµ
µ − Y
N
µ2
)
= Y
N
µ2
(
1 + PY
N
P
Y N
+ 1
)
.
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth λ¯, government spending GN and
the markup µ determine the following steady-state values:
P˜ = P (µ) , (291a)
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, GN , µ
)
, (291b)
B˜ = B
(
λ¯, GN , µ
)
, (291c)
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where partial derivatives are given by (217) and (218), and partial derivatives with respect
to the markup are:
Pµ ≡ ∂P˜
∂µ
=
Y NK
µ
hkkk
N
P
= −
(
P˜
µ
)2
Y NK
Y TK
= P 2
h
f
, (292a)
Kµ ≡ ∂K˜
∂µ
=
Y N
µ2(
Y NK
µ − δK
) −
(r
? + δK)
Y NP
µ −
Y NK
µ C
N
P
Y TK
P 2
µ
(
Y NK
µ − δK
)
 , (292b)
where we used the fact that PhkkkNP − Y NK = −hk = −µ (r? + δK) and hkkkNP = −Y
T
K
P 2
µ.
In order to get more interpretable analytical expressions, we use the negative and posi-
tive roots found with a fixed markup since they are good approximates of the negative and
positive roots found with an endogenous markup. Partial derivatives (292) can be rewritten
as follows:
Pµ = − P˜ ν1
µν2
> 0, if kT > kN , (293a)
= − P˜ ν2
µν1
> 0, if kN > kT , (293b)
Kµ =
Y N
µ2ν1
− P˜
ν1ν2
[
(r? + δK)
Y NP
µ
− (ν1 + δK)CNP
]
≶ 0, if kT > kN , (293c)
=
Y N
µ2ν2
− P˜
ν1ν2
[
(r? + δK)
Y NP
µ
− (ν2 + δK)CNP
]
> 0, if kN > kT , (293d)
where we used the fact that hkkkNP = − µP
Y TK
P to derive the first equality of (293a). In
addition, we made use of the following property Y Nµ = −Pµ Y NP and Y Tµ = −Pµ Y TP to
determine (293c)-(293d). Finally, use has been made of property (338) to rewrite Y TP −CTP
and property (39b) to simplify µY TK + µY
N
K which is equal to P˜ µr
? in the long-run.
Since the change in the markup modifies the long-run levels of real consumption and
labor supply through the steady-state change in the relative price of non tradables, it is
convenient to rewrite their steady-state functions, i.e., their short-run static solutions (26)
that hold in the long-run, in terms of λ¯ and µ:
C = m
(
λ¯, µ
)
, L = n
(
λ¯, µ
)
, (294)
where partial derivatives are given by (27) evaluated at the steady-state (that’s why we
substitute respectively the notations m and n for C and L) and
mµ ≡ ∂C˜
∂µ
= αCσCC˜
ν1
ν2
< 0, if kT > kN , (295a)
= αCσCC˜
ν2
ν1
< 0, if kN > kT , (295b)
nµ ≡ ∂L˜
∂µ
= −σLL˜k˜
T
W˜
P˜ h˜
f˜
P˜ r?
µ2
< 0. (295c)
We computed (295c) as follows: nµ = σLL˜k˜
T
W˜
P˜Y NK
µY TK
P˜ r?
µ .
Following the same procedure, i. e. substituting the steady-state function for the real
exchange rate into the static solution for wage evaluated at the steady-state, the steady-
state function for wage can be rewritten as follows:
W =W (µ) , (296)
54
where the partial derivative w. r. t. µ is given by:
Wµ ≡ ∂W˜
∂µ
= −k˜T P˜ h˜
f˜
P˜ r?
µ2
< 0, (297)
where Wµ = k˜T
P˜Y NK
µY TK
P˜ r?
µ with
Y NK
Y TK
= − h˜
f˜
< 0.
Finally, following a similar procedure, we may express the rental rate of physical capital
as a function of µ:
rK = rK (µ) , (298)
where the partial derivative w. r. t. µ is given by:
rKµ ≡
∂r˜K
∂µ
= −r? P˜
µ
ν1
ν2
> 0, if kT > kN , (299)
rKµ ≡
∂r˜K
∂µ
= −r? P˜
µ
ν2
ν1
> 0, if kN > kT . (300)
Derivation of the Equilibrium Value of the Marginal Utility of Wealth
In a second step, we determine the equilibrium change of λ¯ by taking the total differ-
ential of the intertemporal solvency condition (289d):
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ] dλ¯ = − [vGN − Φ1KGN ] dGN , (301)
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯ as a function of government spending
on the non-traded good:
λ¯ = λ
(
GN
)
, (302)
with
λGN ≡
∂λ¯
∂GN
= − [vGN − Φ1KGN ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
. (303)
L No-Entry
In this section, we develop an alternative version of the two-sector model with a perfectly
competitive sector producing a traded good and an imperfectly competitive sector pro-
ducing a non-traded good. We assume that each producer j of a unique variety of the
non-traded good has the following technology XNj = H (Kj ,Lj) with Kj the capital stock
and Lj labor. While in section L we consider a model with free entry and endogenous
markups, in this section, we solve the model by considering no-entry which implies that the
markups are fixed but profits are no longer driven down to zero.
L.1 Framework
The final non-traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-
returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral
non-traded goods:
Y N =
[∫ 1
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 , (304)
where ω > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral
goods and QNj stands for intermediate consumption of sector’j variety (with j ∈ [0, N ]).
The final good producers behave competitively, and the households use the final good for
both consumption and investment.
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In each of the j sectors, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are
aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good by a CES aggregating function. The non-traded
output sectoral good j is:43
QNj = N−
1
²−1
[∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di] ²²−1 , (305)
where XNi,j stands for output of firm i in sector j and ² is the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties.
Denoting by P and Pj the relative price of the final good and of the jth variety of the
intermediate good, respectively, the profit the final good producer is written as follows:
ΠN = P
[∫ N
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 − ∫ 1
0
PjQNj dj. (306)
Total cost minimizing for a given level of final output gives the (intratemporal) demand
function for each input:
QNj =
(Pj
P
)−ω
Y N , (307)
and the price of the final output is given by:
P =
(∫ 1
0
P1−ωj dj
) 1
1−ω
, (308)
where Pj is the price index of sector j and P is the price of the final good.
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one
variety XNi,j is a price setter. Intermediate output XNi,j is produced using capital KNi,j and
labor LNi,j :
XNi,j = H
(KNi,j ,LNi,j) . (309)
Denoting by Pi,j the price of good i in sector j, the profit function for the jth sector
good producer denoted by piNj is:
piNj ≡ PjN−
1
²−1
(∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di) ²²−1 − ∫ N
0
Pi,jXNi,jdi. (310)
The demand faced by each producer XNi,j is defined as :
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−² QNj
N
, (311)
and the price index of sector j is given by:
Pj = N−
1
1−²
(∫ N
0
P1−²i,j di
) 1
1−²
. (312)
Combining (307) and (311), the demand for variety XNi,j can be expressed in terms of
the relative price of the final non-traded good:
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−²(Pj
P
)−ω Y N
N
. (313)
43By having the term N−
1
²−1 in (305), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates
solely on the effects of markup variation.
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In order to operate, each intermediate good producer must pay a fixed cost denoted by
FC measured in terms of the final good which is assumed to be symmetric across firms.
Each firm j chooses capital and labor to maximize profits. The profit function for the ith
producer in sector j denoted by piNi,j is:
piNi,j ≡ PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj −WLNj − PFC. (314)
The demands for capital and hours worked are given by the equalities of the markup-
adjusted marginal revenues of capital PjHKµ and labor
PjHL
µ , to the capital rental rate r
K
and the producer wage W , respectively.
L.2 First-Order Conditions
The current-value Hamiltonian for the j-th firm’s optimization problem in the non-traded
sector writes as follows:
HNj = PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj −WLNj − PFC + ηj [H (KNj ,LNj )−XNi,j] , (315)
where XNj stands for the demand for variety j; firm j chooses KNj and LNj to maximize
profits treating the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for the non-traded sector
write as follows:
PjHK + ηHK = rK , , (316a)
PjHL + ηHL = W, (316b)
ηj = P ′jHj , (316c)
Combining (316a)-(316b) with (316c), by assuming that firms j are symmetric, yields:
PjHK
(
1− 1
ej
)
= rK , (317a)
PjHL
(
1− 1
ej
)
=W, (317b)
where we used the fact that
P ′j
PjXNi,j
= − 1ej .
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate good sector
produce the output level XNi,j = XN with the same quantities of labor LNi,j = LN and
capital KNi,j = KN . Hence, the aggregate stock of physical capital and hours worked are
KN = NKN and LN = NLN , respectively. They also set the same price Pi,j = P. Hence,
eqs. (308) and (312) imply that P = P .
Defining the markup as follows µ = ee−1 , first-order conditions are:
P
HK
µ
= rK , (318a)
P
HL
µ
=W. (318b)
We further assume no-entry so that profits can be positive. Aggregating over the number
of competitors, aggregate profits can be rewritten as:
ΠN ≡ NpiN = PH (KN , LN)− rKKN −WLN − PNFC. (319)
Using constant returns to scale in production, i. e. Y N = HKKN + HLLN , substituting
the short-run static solution for non-traded output (36), using the fact that PHK/µ = rK
and PHL/µ =W , we have:
ΠN = ΠN
(
K,P, λ¯
)
= P
[
Y N
(
K,P, λ¯
)(
1− 1
µ
)
−NFC
]
, (320)
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where the partial derivatives of aggregate profits in the non-traded sector with respect to
K,P, λ¯ are given by:
ΠNP ≡
∂ΠN
∂P
=
ΠN
P
+ PY NP
(
1− 1
µ
)
> 0, (321a)
ΠNK ≡
∂ΠN
∂K
= PY NK
(
1− 1
µ
)
≷ 0, (321b)
ΠNλ¯ ≡
∂ΠN
∂λ¯
= PY Nλ¯
(
1− 1
µ
)
≶ 0. (321c)
L.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
Inserting short-run static solutions (26), (28) and (36) into (5d) and (12), we obtain:
K˙ =
Y N
(
K,P, λ¯
)
µ
+
ΠN
(
K,P, λ¯
)
P
− CN (λ¯, P )− δKK −GN , (322a)
P˙ = P
{
r? + δK −
hk
[
kN (P )
]
µ
}
, (322b)
where we used the fact that Y N −NFC = Y Nµ + Π
N
P .
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, P˜ the
steady-state values of x = K,P , we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, P˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, P (t)− P˜
)T
, (323)
where J is given by
J ≡
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
, (324)
where the elements b11, b12, b21, b22 are given by:
b11 =
Y NK
µ
+ Y NK
(
1− 1
µ
)
− δK = h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, (325a)
b12 =
Y NP
µ
+
ΠNP
P˜
− Π˜
N
P˜ 2
− CNP =
Y NP
µ
+ Y NP
(
1− 1
µ
)
− CNP > 0, (325b)
b21 = 0, b22 = −P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) = Y TK
P˜
≶ 0. (325c)
where we used (321a) to determine (325b).
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2× 2 matrix (324) is unambiguously
negative:
Det J = b11b22 =
Y TK
P˜
[(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
+ Y NK
(
1− 1
µ
)]
=
Y TK
P˜
(
Y NK − δK
)
< 0, (326)
and the trace denoted by Tr is given by
Tr J = b11+ b22 =
1
P˜
(
Y TK +
P˜
µ˜
Y NK
)
− δK +Y NK
(
1− 1
µ
)
= r?+Y NK
(
1− 1
µ
)
> 0, (327)
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium hkµ = r
? + δK .
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The characteristic root reads as:
νi ≡ 12
{
TrJ±
√
(TrJ)2 − 4DetJ
}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (328)
Using (326) and (327), the characteristic root can be rewritten as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{(
Y NK − δK
)
+
Y TK
P˜
±
[(
Y NK − δK
)− Y TK
P˜
]}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (329)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real-valued eigenvalues,
satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (330)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, P , the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
General solutions paths are given by :
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (331a)
P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (331b)
where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue νi is given
by
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
, (332)
with b11 and b12 given by (325a) and (325b), respectively.
Case kN > kT
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio in the non-traded good
sector exceeds the capital-labor in the traded sector. From (329), the stable and unstable
eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 =
Y TK
P˜
= − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) < 0, (333a)
ν2 = Y NK − δK =
h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK > 0. (333b)
We sign several useful expressions:
Y NK = (ν2 + δK) > 0, (334a)
Y TK = P˜ ν1 < 0, (334b)
P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= −ν1 > 0, (334c)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
T (ν2 + δK) < 0, (334d)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν1 > 0. (334e)
We write out eigenvector ωi associated with eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2), to determine
their signs:
ω1 =
(
1 (+)
ν1−ν2
(Y NP −CNP )
(−)
)
, ω2 =
(
1 (+)
0
)
. (335)
Case kT > kN
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This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio in the traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor ratio in the non traded sector. From (329), the stable and unstable
eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 = Y NK − δK =
h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK < 0, (336a)
ν2 =
Y TK
P˜
= − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) > 0. (336b)
We write out eigenvector ωi associated with eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2), to determine
their signs:
ω1 =
(
1 (+)
0
)
, ω2 =
(
0
ν2−ν1
(Y NP −CNP )
(+)
)
. (337)
As in the case of free entry and fixed marked, no entry implies that when the real exchange
rate remains unaffected after a permanent fiscal shock (since ω12 = 0) when k
T >N .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = (ν1 + δK) < 0, (338a)
Y TK = P˜ ν2 > 0, (338b)
P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= −ν2 < 0, (338c)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
T (ν1 + δK) > 0, (338d)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν2 < 0. (338e)
L.4 Current Account Dynamics
In this subsection, we derive the current account equation, the stable path for foreign assets
and the intertemporal solvency condition. Substituting the definition of lump-sum taxes Z
by using (10), and the market clearing condition for non-traded goods (322a) into (3) we
get:
B˙ = r?B + rKK(t) +WL+ΠN − PCC − PI − Z,
= r?B +
(
rKK +WL
)
+ΠN − PCC −GT − PGN − P
(
Y N − CN −GN −NFC) .
Using the fact that LT + LN = L, KT +KN = K, and substituting the expression of
aggregate profits in the non-traded sector, i.e., ΠN = PY N −WLN − rKKN −PNFC, the
dynamic equation for the current account can be rewritten as follows:
B˙ = r?B − CT −GT + [WLT + rKKT ]+ [WLN + rKKN]+ [PY N −WLN − rKKN − PNFC]
−P [Y N −NFC] ,
= r?B + Y T − CT −GT , (339)
Inserting general solutions for K(t) and P (t), the solution for the stock of international
assets is given by follows:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
+ Y TK
2∑
i=1
Bie
νit +
[
Y TP − CTP
] 2∑
i=1
Biω
i
2e
νit. (340)
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Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:
B(t)− B˜ =
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (341)
with
Φi =
Ni
νi − r? =
Y TK +
[
Y TP − CTP
]
ωi2
νi − r? , i = 1, 2. (342)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the terms in brackets
of equation (341) must be zero and we must set B2 = 0. We obtain the linearized version
of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
B0 − B˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (343)
The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
B(t)− B˜ = Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
. (344)
Case kN > kT
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12 = P˜ ν1 +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12 ≷ 0, (345a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω22, (345b)
= Y TK = P˜ ν1 < 0, (345c)
where we used the fact that ω22 = 0. Hence we have:
Φ2 =
N2
ν2 − r? =
P˜ ν1
ν2 − r? . (346)
Case kT > kN
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12 = P˜ ν2 > 0, (347a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω22 = P˜ ν2 +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω22 ≶ 0, (347b)
where we used the fact that ω12 = 0. Hence we have:
Φ1 =
N1
ν1 − r? =
P˜ ν2
ν1 − r? . (348)
L.5 Savings Dynamics
The stock of financial wealth is A ≡ B + PK. Differentiating with respect to time, substi-
tuting the dynamic equations for foreign bonds (3), capital stock (4), and the real exchange
rate (322b), i.e., A˙ = B˙ + P˙K + PK˙, the stock of financial wealth evolves as follows:
A˙ = r?A+WL+ΠN − PCC − Z. (349)
Substituting short-run static solutions for the real wage, labor supply, aggregate profits,
consumption price index, consumption, eq. (349) can be rewritten as follows:
A˙ = r?A+W (P )L
(
λ¯, P
)
+ΠN
(
K,P, λ¯
)− PC (P )C (P, λ¯)−GT − PGN , (350)
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where we used the fact that Z = GT + PGN . Linearizing (350) in the neighborhood of the
steady-state, we have:
A˙ = r?
(
A(t)− A˜
)
+M
(
P (t)− P˜
)
+ΠNK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
(351)
where
M = WP L˜+ W˜LP +ΠNP − P ′CC˜ − PCCP −GN ,
= WP L˜ (1 + σL) +
Π˜N
P˜
+ P˜ Y NP
(
1− 1
µ
)
− C˜N (1− σC)−GN . (352)
The general solution for the stock of financial wealth is:
A(t) = A˜+
[(
A0 − A˜
)
− Π
N
K +Mω12
ν1 − r? B1 −
ΠNK +Mω22
ν2 − r? B2
]
er
?t
+
ΠNK +Mω12
ν1 − r? B1e
ν1t +
ΠNK +Mω22
ν2 − r? B2e
ν2t. (353)
Invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the stable solution for financial wealth:
A(t) = A˜+
ΠNK +Mω12
ν1 − r? B1e
ν1t, (354)
and the intertemporal solvency condition
A˜−A0 = Π
N
K +Mω12
ν1 − r?
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (355)
L.6 Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case of No-Entry
In this subsection, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by assuming
that labor supply is elastically supplied. To keep things simple, we assume that the traded
sector is more capital intensive, i.e. kT > kN .
Substituting first the appropriate short-un static solutions, the steady-state of the econ-
omy is obtained by setting K˙, P˙ , B˙ = 0 and is defined by the following set of equations:
hk
[
kN
(
P˜
)]
µ
= r? + δK , (356a)
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
µ
+
ΠN
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
P˜
− CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
− δKK˜ −GN = 0, (356b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GT = 0, (356c)
and the intertemporal solvency condition(
B0 − B˜
)
= Φ
(
K0 − K˜
)
, (356d)
where we used the fact that Π
N
P + Y
N/µ = Y N − NFC. The steady-state equilibrium
composed by these four equations jointly determine P˜ , K˜, B˜ and λ¯.
We totally differentiate the system (356d) evaluated at the steady-state which yields in
a matrix form:
hkkk
N
P
µ 0 0 0(
Y NP − CNP
)
Y NK − δK
(
Y N
λ¯
− CN
λ¯
)
0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK
(
Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
r?
0 −Φ1 0 1


dP˜
dK˜
dλ¯
dB˜
 =

0
dGN
dGT
0
 . (357)
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The determinant denoted by D′ of the matrix (356) of coefficients is given by:
D′ ≡ hkkk
N
P
µ
{(
Y NK − δK
) (
Y Tλ¯ − CTλ¯
)− (Y Nλ¯ − CNλ¯ ) [Y TK + r?Φ1]} (358)
Assuming kT > kN , then the determinant D′ reads as:
D′ = −ν1ν2
P˜ λ¯
{(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+
P˜ (ν1 + δK)
r? − ν1
(
1− 1
µ
)[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (r? + δK)
]}
> 0. (359)
where we used the fact that ν2 = r?− ν1+ (ν1 + δK)
(
1− 1µ
)
. Moreover, we computed the
following expression:
kNν2 + kT (ν1 + δK) = − k
Nf
P (kN − kT ) + k
T h
kN − kT ,
= −W
P
+ Y NK
(
1− 1
µ
)
,
= −W
P
+ kT (ν1 + δK)
(
1− 1
µ
)
. (360)
The steady-state changes following an unanticipated permanent increase inGN are given
by:
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (361a)
dλ¯
dGN
= − 1
D′
hkkk
N
P
µ
(
Y TK + r
?Φ1
)
, (361b)
dK˜
dGN
=
1
D′
hkkk
N
P
µ
(
Y Tλ¯ − CTλ¯
)
, (361c)
dB˜
dGN
= Φ1
dK˜
dGN
. (361d)
Assuming that kT > kN , the steady-state changes for K and λ¯ can be rewritten as
follows:
dK˜
dGN
= −
P˜
(
σLL˜k˜
Nν2 − σC C˜TP˜
)
ν1
[(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+ Γ˜
] ≶ 0, (362a)
dλ¯
dGN
=
P˜ ν2λ¯
(r? − ν1)
1[(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+ Γ˜
] > 0, (362b)
where 0 < ν2(r?−ν1) =
ν2
ν2−(ν1+δK)
(
1− 1
µ
) < 1 and we have set
Γ˜ =
P˜ (ν1 + δK)
r? − ν1
(
1− 1
µ
)[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (r? + δK)
]
> 0. (363)
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L.7 Impact Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case of No-Entry
This section estimates the impact effects of a permanent fiscal expansion when the traded
sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. The stable adjustment of the
economy is described by a saddle-path in (K,P )-space. The capital stock, the real exchange
rate, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:
K(t) = K˜ +B1eν1t, (364a)
P (t) = P˜ + ω12B1e
ν1t, (364b)
B(t) = B˜ +Φ1B1eν1t, (364c)
where ω12 = 0, Φ1 = − P˜ ν2r?−ν1 if kT > kN and with
B1 = K0 − K˜ = −dK˜,
where we made used the fact that K0 is predetermined.
We derive below the initial reactions of investment and the current account by assuming
that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector.
kT > kN
Differentiating (364a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0, and substituting (79d), the
initial response of investment is:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ν1 dK˜dGN =
P˜
(
σLL˜k˜
Nν2 − σC C˜TP˜
)
ν1
[(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+ Γ˜
] ≷ 0. (365)
Using the fact that Φ1 = − P˜ ν2r?−ν1 , the initial reaction of the current account is:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
=
P˜ ν2
r? − ν1 ν1
dK˜
dGN
= − P˜ ν2
r? − ν1
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
≶ 0. (366)
L.8 Effect on Aggregate Profits of a Permanent Fiscal Expansion
Since the wealth of households depends now on the present value of profits, the wealth
effect triggered by a fiscal expansion is modified compared to the case of free entry. In this
subsection, we compute the change in the present discounted value of profits denoted by Π
which is defined as follows:
Π =
∫ ∞
0
ΠN (t)e−r
?tdt. (367)
Substituting the short-run static solution for ΠN given by eq. (320) and linearizing around
the steady-state, we have:
ΠN (t) = Π˜N +
[
ΠNK +Π
N
P ω
1
2
] (
K(t)− K˜
)
,
where we used the fact that P (t)− P˜ = ω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
. We set
Υ = ΠNK +Π
N
P ω
1
2. (368)
Substituting the linearized version of ΠN (t) into eq. (367) and solving yields;
Π =
Π˜N
r?
+
ΥB1
r? − ν1 . (369)
64
where we substituted the stable solution for K(t) given by eq. (331a).
Differentiating (369) w.r.t. GN , the change in the present value of profits is given by
dΠ
dGN
=
ΠN
λ¯
r?
dλ¯
dGN
− ν1Π
N
K
r? (r? − ν1)
dK˜
dGN
,
=
dλ¯
dGN
(ν1 + δK)
λ¯r? (r? − ν1)
(
1− 1
µ
)[
σLL˜P˜ k˜
T (r? + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
]
− P˜ (ν1 + δK)
r? (r? − ν1)
(
1− 1
µ
)
,
= −
P˜
(
1− 1µ
)
(ν1 + δK)
r? (r? − ν1)
 dλ¯dGN
[
σLL˜k˜
T (r? + δK)− σCC˜N
]
λ¯
+ 1
 > 0,(370)
where we used the fact that B1 = −dK˜, ω12 = 0 which implies that Υ = ΠNK , and dΠ˜N =
ΠN
λ¯
dλ¯+ΠNKdK˜ to get the first line, we used the fact that dK˜ = Kλ¯dλ¯+KGNdG
N (see eq.
(373a )), expression of Kλ¯ given by eq. (374a) and the fact that
Πλ¯ = −
σLL˜P˜ k˜
T (ν1 + δK)
λ¯
(
1− 1
µ
)
> 0, (371a)
ΠNK = P˜ (ν1 + δK)
(
1− 1
µ
)
< 0. (371b)
L.9 The Effects of Temporary Fiscal Shocks: The Case of Elastic Labor
Supply
In this section, we derive formal solutions for temporary shocks under no-entry, by assuming
elastic labor supply. The derivations of formal solutions are only possible if we assume
kT > kN since when sectoral capital intensities are reversed, we are not able to derive
useful (i.e., interpretable) expressions.
We first solve the system (356a)-(356c) for P˜ , K˜ and B˜ as functions of the marginal
utility of wealth, λ¯ and government spending GN . Totally differentiating equations (356a)-
(356c) yields in matrix form: hkkk
N
P
µ 0 0(
Y NP − CNP
) (
Y NK − δK
)
0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
?

 dP˜dK˜
dB˜

=
 0− (Y N
λ¯
− CN
λ¯
)
dλ¯+ dGN
− (Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
dλ¯
 . (372)
Steady-state values of K and B can be expressed as functions of the shadow value of
wealth and government spending GN :
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (373a)
B˜ = B
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (373b)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= −
(
Y N
λ¯
− CN
λ¯
)(
Y NK − δK
) , (374a)
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜
∂λ¯
=
Y TK
(
Y N
λ¯
− CN
λ¯
)− (Y NK − δK) (Y Tλ¯ − CTλ¯ )
r?
(
Y NK − δK
) . (374b)
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We sign expressions when kT > kN :
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)
]
> 0, (375a)
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜
∂λ¯
=
{
σC
(
P˜ C˜Nν2 − C˜T ν1
)
+ ν2P˜ σLL˜
[
k˜Nν1 − k˜T (ν1 + δK)
]}
r?ν1λ¯
< 0, if kT > kN ,(375b)
and
KGN ≡
∂K˜
∂GN
=
1
Y NK − δK
=
1
ν1
< 0, (376a)
BGN ≡
∂B˜
∂GN
= − Y
T
K(
Y NK − δK
)
r?
= − P˜ ν2
r?ν1
> 0. (376b)
To derive solutions for temporary fiscal shocks, we have to solve the following system:
B1 +B2 = −Kλ¯dλ¯−KGNdGN , (377a)
B1e
ν1T +B2eν2T −B′1eν1T = −KGNdGN , (377b)
ω12B1e
ν1T + ω22B2e
ν2T − ω12B′1eν1T = 0, (377c)
and
B1Υ1 +B2Υ2 +Bλ¯dλ¯ = Ω1, (378)
where we set
Υ1 ≡ Φ1, (379a)
Υ2 ≡ Φ2 + (Φ1 − Φ2) e(ν2−r?)T , (379b)
Ω1 ≡
[
(BGN − Φ1KGN ) e−r
?T −BGN
]
dGN . (379c)
Adopting the same procedure as described in section K.7, we derive formal expressions
below for constants B1, B2 and B′1 when kT > kN . We were unable to derive useful formal
expressions with the sector reversal of capital intensities.
Case kT > kN
When considering elastic labor and no entry, the solutions after a rise in GN are:
B1
dGN
= −
{[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+ Γ
]
+ P˜ ν2r?−ν1
(
1− e−r?T ) [σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N]}
ν1
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+ Γ
] ≷ 0,(380a)
B2
dGN
= 0, (380b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
+KGN e
−ν1T
= − 1
ν1
(1− e−ν1T )+
P˜ ν2
r?−ν1
(
1− e−r?T ) [σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N][(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+ Γ
]
 ≷ 0, (380c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (380d)
where λGN represents the change in the equilibrium value of the shadow value of wealth
after a permanent increase in GN (see eq. (362b)).
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General solutions for K and P are:
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (381a)
P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t. (381b)
Differentiating eq. (381a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating w.r.t.
GN , we obtain the initial response of investment following a temporary rise in government
spending on the non-traded good:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
+ ν2
B2
dGN
.
Substituting (380a) and using the fact that B2dGN = 0, the initial reaction of investment is
given by:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
,
= −
1 + ν2r? − ν1
(
1− e−r?T
) [σLL˜k˜T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N][(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+ Γ
]
 ≶ 0.(382)
The general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:
B(t) = B˜ +
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (383)
Differentiating eq. (383) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating w.r.t.
GN , we obtain the initial response of the current account after a temporary rise in GN :
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
[
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2
B2
dGN
]
+ ν1
B1Φ1
dGN
+ ν2
B2Φ2
dGN
.
Using the fact that
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2
B2
dGN
= −
[
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ (BGN − Φ1KGN )
]
,
= − (BGN − Φ1KGN ) e−r
?T = − P˜ ν2
r? (r? − ν1)e
−r?T , (384)
the initial reaction of the current account can be rewritten as follows:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= − P˜ ν2
(r? − ν1)e
−r?T − ν1 P˜ ν2(r? − ν1)
B1
dGN
,
=
P˜ ν2
r? − ν1
(
1− e−r?T
)1 + ν2
r? − ν1
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ (ν1 + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
)
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+ Γ
]
 ≷ 0,
= − P˜ ν2
(r? − ν1) P˜ e
−r?T
+
P˜ ν2
(r? − ν1)
1 + P˜ ν2(r? − ν1)
(
1− e−r?T
) [σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK)− σCC˜N][(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+ Γ˜
]
 ≶ 0,(385)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = − P˜ ν2r?−ν1 .
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L.10 Effect on Aggregate Profits of a Temporary Fiscal Expansion
Since the wealth of households depends now on the present value of profits, the wealth
effect triggered by a fiscal expansion is modified compared to that under free entry. In
this subsection, we compute the change in the present discounted value of profits after a
temporary fiscal expansion. Hence, the present value of profits denoted by Π evaluated over
two sub-periods (0, T ) and (T ,∞) is:
Π =
∫ T
0
ΠN (t)e−r
?tdt+
∫ ∞
T
ΠN (t)e−r
?tdt. (386)
The linearized versions of aggregate profits in the non-traded sector over period 1 (say over
(0, T )) and over period 2 (say over (T,∞)) are:
ΠN (t) = Π˜N1 +Π
N
K
(
K(t)− K˜1
)
= Π˜N1 +Π
N
KB1e
ν1t,
ΠN (t) = Π˜N2 +Π
N
K
(
K(t)− K˜2
)
= Π˜N2 +Π
N
KB
′
1e
ν1t,
where we used the fact that ω12 = 0 so that the dynamics for the relative price degenerate
and the fact that the constant B2 = 0.
Substituting linearized versions of ΠN (t) for periods (0, T ) and (T,∞) into eq. (386)
and solving yields:
Π =
Π˜N1
(
1− e−r?T )
r?
+ΠNKB1
(
1− e−(r?−ν1)T )
(r? − ν1) +
Π˜N2 e
−r?T
r?
+ΠNKB
′
1
e−(r?−ν1)T
(r? − ν1) . (387)
Using the fact that B1 + B2 = −Kλ¯dλ¯ − KGNdGN , with B2 = 0 and KGN = 1/ν1,
and differentiating eq. (387) w.r.t. GN , the change in the present value of profits after a
temporary fiscal expansion is given by
dΠ
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
ΠN
λ¯
r?
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− ν1Π
N
K
r? (r? − ν1)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Π
N
K
(
1− e−r?T )
r? (r? − ν1)
=
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
(ν1 + δK)
λ¯r? (r? − ν1)
(
1− 1
µ
)[
σLL˜P˜ k˜
T (r? + δK)− σC P˜ C˜N
]
− P˜ (ν1 + δK)
r? (r? − ν1)
(
1− 1
µ
)
,
= −
P˜
(
1− 1µ
)
(ν1 + δK)
r? (r? − ν1)
(
1− e−r?T
){
λGN
[
σLL˜k˜
T (r? + δK)− σCC˜N
]
+ 1
}
> 0,
=
(
1− e−r?T
) dΠ
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
, (388)
where we used the fact that dΠ˜N1 = Π˜
N
1 − Π˜N0 = ΠNKdK˜1 +ΠNλ¯ dλ¯ and dΠ˜N2 = Π˜N2 − Π˜N0 =
ΠNKdK˜+Π
N
λ¯
dλ¯, and dK˜1 = K˜1−K0 = Kλ¯dλ¯+KGNdGN , and dK˜ = K˜2−K˜0 = Kλ¯dλ¯ and
collected terms to get the first line, we factorize by dλ¯dGN
∣∣
temp
and substitute expressions
of ΠNK and Π
N
λ¯
given by eq. (371) to get the second line, substitute the expression of the
change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth given by (380d) and (362b)
to get the third line. Eq. (370) shows that the change in the present value of profits is a
scaled-down version of the change after a permanent fiscal shock.
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When kN > kT , we computed the present value of profits numerically by adopting a
similar procedure. First, linearizing versions of aggregate profits in the non-traded sector
over period 1 (say over (0, T )) and over period 2 (say over (T ,∞)) are:
ΠN (t) = Π˜N1 +Θ
1
(
K(t)− K˜1
)
,
= Π˜N1 +Θ
1B1e
ν1t +Θ2B2eν2t,
ΠN (t) = Π˜N2 +Θ
2
(
K(t)− K˜2
)
= Π˜N2 +Θ
1B′1e
ν1t,
where Θ1 = ΠNK + Π
N
P ω
1
2 since the relative price dynamics do no longer degenerate and
Θ2 = ΠNK since ω
2
2 = 0.
Substituting linearized versions of ΠN (t) for periods (0, T ) and (T,∞) into eq. (386)
and solving yields:
Π =
Π˜N1
(
1− e−r?T )
r?
+Θ1B1
(
1− e−(r?−ν1)T )
(r? − ν1) + Θ
2B2
(
1− e−(r?−ν2)T )
(r? − ν2)
+
Π˜N2 e
−r?T
r?
+Θ1B′1
e−(r?−µ1)T
(r? − µ1) . (389)
M Solving a Two-Sector Model with Endogenous Markup
In this section, we provide the main steps to solve the two-sector model without capital
accumulation. This allows us to isolate the fiscal policy transmission in open economy with
endogenous markups.
The small open economy produces a traded and a non traded good by means of a
production technology described by linearly homogenous production functions that use
labor only. As previously, the output of the non traded good (Y N ) can be used for private
(CN ) and public consumption (GN ). The output of the traded good (Y T ) can be consumed
by households (CT ) and the government (GT ), or can be exported (Y T − CT −GT ).
M.1 First-Order Conditions
Households
Households decide on consumption and worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility (2)
subject to the flow budget constraint given by:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +W (t)L(t)− Z(t)− PC (P (t))C(t). (390)
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (390) by λ, the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
−σC , (391a)
L =
(
λ
γ
W
)σL
, (391b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (391c)
and the appropriate transversality conditions. We impose β = r? in order to generate an
interior solution for the marginal utility of wealth. Hence, we have λ = λ¯.
Firms
There are two sectors in the economy: a perfectly competitive sector which produces
a traded good denoted by the superscript T and an imperfectly competitive sector which
produces a non-traded good denoted by the superscript N . Both the traded and non-traded
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sectors use labor, LT and LN , according to linearly homogenous production functions. The
technology of production in the traded sector is described by the following production
function: Y Y = LT . We assume that each producer of a unique variety of the non-traded
good has the following technology XNj = LNj where Lj is labor. In this subsection, we
emphasize the main changes. Further details about the imperfectly competitive non-traded
sector and the derivation of endogenous markups can be found in section K.
Both sectors face a labor cost equal to the wage rate W . Combining first order condi-
tions derived from profit-maximization which state that factors are paid to their respective
marginal products together with the assumption of perfect mobility of labor across sectors
yields:
1 =
P
µ
=W. (392)
Hence, according to (392), the real exchange rate is equal to the markup while the wage
rate must remain unchanged:
P = µ, and W = 1. (393)
We follow Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] by taking into
account the influence of the individual price on the sectoral price index:
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (394)
Because the price-elasticity of demand e increases with the number of firms N , the
markup µ = ee−1 is decreasing as the number of competitors rise:
µ = µ (N) , µN < 0. (395)
The partial derivatives of the price-elasticity of demand and the markup with respect to
the number of firms are:
ηe,N =
∂e
∂N
N
e
=
²− ω
Ne
> 0, ηµ,N =
∂µ
∂N
N
µ
= −ηe,N 1
e− 1 < 0. (396)
We further assume that free entry drives profits down to zero in all industries of the
non-traded sector at each instant of time. Using constant returns to scale in production
and denoting by LN aggregate labor in the non-traded sector with LN = NLN , the zero
profit condition (in the aggregate) is:
PLN −WLN − PNψ = 0. (397)
where ψ corresponds to fixed costs. Using (392), the zero-profit condition (397) can be
rewritten as:
LN
(
1− 1
µ (N)
)
= Nψ. (398)
Aggregating labor over the two sectors, gives us the resource constraint for labor:
LT + LN = L, (399)
where LN = NLN .
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M.2 Short-run Static Solutions
Inserting W = 1, eq. (391b) can be rewritten as follows:
L =
(
λ¯
γ
)σL
. (400)
Solving (391a) and (391b), we get:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
, L = L
(
λ¯
)
, (401)
where partial derivatives are given by:
dC = −σCC
λ¯
dλ¯− σCαCC
P
dP, (402a)
dL = σL
L
λ¯
dλ¯. (402b)
Inserting short-run solution for consumption (401) into intra-temporal allocations be-
tween non tradable and tradable goods, allows us to solve for CT and CN :
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, (403)
where
dCT = −σCC
T
λ¯
dλ¯+ αC
CT
P
(φ− σC) dP, (404a)
dCN = −σCC
N
λ¯
dλ¯− C
N
P
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC) dP, (404b)
The zero profit condition (398) can be solved for the number of producers in the non-
traded sector:
N = N
(
LN
)
, (405)
where the number of competitors is positively related with production in the non-traded
sector LN as shown formally below:
∂N
∂LN
=
Nψ
LN
(
ψ − LNNµηµ,N
) > 0, (406)
where ηµ,N < 0 is the elasticity of the markup to the number of competitors and is defined
by (396).
Eq. (393) which states that P = µ can be solved for the relative price of non-tradables
by inserting (405):
P = P
(
LN
)
. (407)
Differentiating implies a negative relationship between the relative price of non-tradables
and labor in the non-traded sector:
∂P
∂LN
= ηµ,NηN,LN
P
LN
< 0, (408)
where ηN,LN = NLNLN/N > 0 (with NLN given by (406)) is the elasticity of the number
of competitors to non-traded output Y N = LN .
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M.3 Market Clearing Conditions
Inserting short-run static solutions for CN given by (403) into the non-traded good market
clearing condition gives us:
LN
µ
= CN
(
λ¯, P
)
+GN . (409)
The non-traded good market clearing condition can be solved for non-traded labor by using
the fact that P = µ and inserting the short-run static solution (407) for the relative price
of non-tradables:
LN = LN
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (410)
where LN
λ¯
< 0 and LN
GN
> 0. The effects of λ¯ and GN on LN can be derived as follows.
Insert first (407), totally differentiate (400), denote by ωC = PCCY the ratio of consumption
expenditure to GDP, and by ωN =
PY N/µ
Y =
LN
L (remembering that Y = Y
T + Pµ Y
N =
LT + LN since P = µ, Y T = LT and Y N = LN ) the ratio of non-traded output less fixed
costs to GDP, we have:
dLN = −ωCαCσCL
N
λ¯χωN
dλ¯+
P
χ
dGN , (411)
where we used the fact that µC
N
LN
= PC
N
LN
= αCωCωN and we set
χ = 1− ηµ,NηN,LN
{
1− αCωC
ωN
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]
}
> 0. (412)
While the sign of (412) is ambiguous, because ηµ,N is small, χ is positive.
Combining the short-run static solution for the relative price of non-tradables P =
P
(
LN
)
together with the short-run static solution for non-traded labor (410), we have:
P = P
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (413)
with Pλ¯ = PLNL
N
λ¯
> 0 and PGN = PLNLNGN < 0
Inserting first the short-run static solution for labor supply (401) and for non-traded
labor (410), the resource constraint for labor can be solved for LT , i.e., LT = L
(
λ¯
) −
LN
(
λ¯, GN
)
. We get:
LT = LT
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (414)
where LT
λ¯
= Lλ¯ − LNλ¯ > 0, LTGN = −LNGN < 0.
M.4 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Combining the non-traded good market clearing condition (409) and the flow budget con-
straint yields the current account equation:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + LT − CT −GT . (415)
Inserting the short-run static solution for traded labor (414) and for consumption in
tradables (403) together with (413), into the current account equation (415) yields:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + LT
(
λ¯, GN
)− CT [λ¯, P (λ¯, GN)]−GT . (416)
Keeping in mind that the marginal utility of wealth is constant over time, i.e., λ(t) = λ¯,
and linearizing (416), we get:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
. (417)
72
The general solution is:
B(t) = B˜ +D2er
?t, (418)
where D2 is a constant to be determined. Invoking the transversality condition, the stable
solution is:
B(t) = B˜, (419)
and the intertemporal solvency condition (ISC) reads:
B˜ = B0. (420)
M.5 Steady-State
Inserting the ISC (420) and appropriate short-run static solutions which obviously hold in
the long-run, the steady-state can be reduced to one equation
r?B0 + LT
(
λ¯, GN
)− CT [λ¯, P (λ¯, GN)]−GT = 0. (421)
Equation (421) can be solved for the marginal utility of wealth:
λ¯ = λ
(
GN
)
. (422)
Totally differentiating (421) yields:{
σL
L˜
λ¯
+ σC
C˜T
λ¯
− LNλ¯
[
1 +
C˜T
P˜
αC (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
P˜
L˜N
]}
dλ¯
−LNGN
[
1 +
C˜T
P˜
αC (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
P˜
L˜N
]
dGN .
Dividing both sides by GDP (i.e., Y = L), using the fact that C
T
LN
= (1−αC)ωCωN and
CT
L =
(1− αC)ωC where we set ωN = PY N/µ/Y = LN/L and ωC = PCC/Y , and collecting
terms, the change in the marginal utility of wealth is given by:
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
=
P˜ λ¯
Y˜ χ
[
1 + ωC(1−αC)αCωN (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
]
Ψ
> 0, (423)
where we set
Ψ = σL+σC (1− αC)ωC+ αCωCσC
χ
[
1 +
(1− αC)ωC
ωN
αC (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
]
> 0. (424)
Eq. (424) has a positive sign as long as ηµ,N < 0 is not too large which holds when µ
takes reasonable values. Hence, a rise in government spending raises the marginal utility
of wealth λ¯ and thereby yields a negative wealth effect which exerts a negative impact on
consumption and a positive influence on labor supply.
Totally differentiating (410) (using (411)) and substituting (423), the change in non-
traded labor is given by:
dLN
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= LNλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ LNGN =
P [σL + ωC (1− αC)σC ]
Ψχ
> 0, (425)
where χ > 0 is given by (412) and Ψ > 0 is given by (424). Because non-traded labor
rises, profit opportunities induce firm to enter the market (see eq. (406)); since the number
of competitors increases, the markup falls (see eq. (395)); as a result, intermediate-good
producers in the non-traded sector set lower prices which results in a real exchange rate
depreciation (see eq. (408)).
73
M.6 Derivation of Steady-State Solutions
In this section, we derive steady-state solutions in the case of an endogenous markup. The
steady-state reduces to two equations:
r?B˜ + L˜T − C˜T −GT = 0, (426a)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition
B˜ = B0, (426b)
which jointly solve for the stock of traded bonds B˜ and the marginal utility of wealth λ¯.
We first solve the system (426a) for B˜ as a function of the marginal utility of wealth,
λ¯ and government spending GN . To do so, substitute solutions for traded labor (414) and
for consumption in tradables (403), into the traded good market clearing condition (426a),
by inserting first solution for the relative price of non-tradables (413) P = P
(
λ,GN
)
, we
have:
r?B˜ + LT
(
λ¯, GN
)− CT [λ¯, P (λ¯, GN)]−GT = 0. (427)
Solving for (428), we get the steady-state value of B can be expressed as a function of
the shadow value of wealth and government spending GN :
B˜ = B
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (428)
with partial derivatives given by:
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜
∂λ¯
= −
(
LT
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
− CTPPλ¯
)
r?
, (429a)
BGN ≡
∂B˜
∂GN
= −
(
LT
GN
− CTPPGN
)
r?
, (429b)
where LT
λ¯
= Lλ¯ −LNλ¯ > 0, Pλ¯ = PLNLNλ¯ > 0, and LTGN = −LNGN < 0, PGN = PLNLNGN < 0.
Using (411), partial derivatives (429) reduce to:
Bλ¯ = −
YΨ
r?λ¯
< 0, (430a)
BGN =
P
[
1 + ωC(1−αC)αCωN (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
]
r?χ
> 0, (430b)
where Ψ > 0 is given by (424).
M.7 Derivation of Formal Solutions after Temporary Fiscal Shocks
In this section, we provide the main steps to derive formal solutions for key variables after
a temporary unanticipated fiscal shock, by applying the procedure developed by Schubert
and Turnovsky [2002].
The small open economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, i.e., λ = λ0 and B = B0.
We suppose now that government expenditure changes unexpectedly at time t = 0 from
the original level GN0 to level G
N
1 over the period 0 ≤ t < T , and reverts back at time T
permanently to its initial level GNT = G
N
2 = G
N
0 .
Period 1 (0 ≤ t < T )
While the fiscal expansion is implemented, the economy follows unstable transitional
paths:
B(t) = B˜1 +D2er
?t, (431)
where D2 is a constant to be determined.
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Period 2 (t ≥ T )
Once government spending reverts back to its initial level, the economy follows stable
paths
B(t) = B˜2 (432)
During the transition period 1, the economy accumulates (or decumulates) foreign as-
sets. Since this period is unstable, it would lead the nation to violate its intertemporal
budget constraint. By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable
and must satisfy the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the
zero-root problem requires the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth to adjust
once-and-for-all when the shock hits the economy. So λ remains constant over the periods
1 and 2. The aim of the formal procedure is to calculate the deviation of λ such that
the country satisfies one single and overall intertemporal budget constraint, given the new
relevant initial condition, BT , accumulated over the unstable period (before the shock is in
effect). Therefore, for the country to remain intertemporally solvent, we require:
B˜2 = BT . (433)
Setting t = 0 in solution (431); evaluate at time t = T and equate (431) and (432):
B˜1 +D2 = B0, (434a)
B˜1 +D2er
?T = B˜2. (434b)
Then, we approximate the steady-state changes with the differentials:
B˜1 − B˜0 ≡ B
(
λ¯, GN1
)−B (λ0, GN0 ) = Bλ¯dλ¯+BGNdGN , (435a)
B˜2 − B˜1 ≡ B
(
λ¯, GN2
)−B (λ¯, GN1 ) = −BGNdGN . (435b)
By substituting these expressions into (434a) and (434b), we obtain finally
D2 = −Bλ¯dλ¯−BGNdGN , (436a)
D2e
r?T = −BGNdGN . (436b)
The two equations (436a)-(436b) jointly determine D2 and λ¯.
Solving yields:
D2 = −BGN e−r
?T dGN < 0, (437a)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (437b)
where λGN corresponds to the change in λ¯ when the rise in government spending GN is
permanent; it is given by:
λGN = −
BGN
Bλ¯
> 0. (438)
Note that (438) coincides with (423). Inserting (423) into (437b) yields the change in
the marginal utility of wealth following a temporary rise in government spending on non-
tradables GN :
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
Pλ¯
Y χ
[
1 + ωC(1−αC)αCωN (φ− σC) ηµ,NηN,LN
]
Ψ
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (439)
Eq. (439) corresponds to eq. (21) in the text. Importantly, following a temporary
fiscal shock, the marginal utility of wealth increases less than after a permanent rise in GN .
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When analyzing the effects of temporary fiscal shocks, we have to consider two periods,
i.e., (0, T ) and (T,∞), and thus two steady-states. Since we are interested in responses
of key macroeconomic variables in the short-run, we derive first the change in non-traded
labor over the first period. To do so, we totally differentiate the solution for non-traded
labor (410):
dL˜N1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dLN (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= LNλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ LNGN > 0, (440)
where dL˜N1 /dG
N = dLN (0)/dGN because non-traded labor adjusts instantaneously to its
steady-state associated with period 1 (i.e., period (0, T ); moreover, we have LN
λ¯
< 0 and
LN
GN
> 0 and we used the fact that dL˜N1 = L˜
N
1 − L˜N0 = LN
(
λ¯, GN1
) − LN (λ0, GN0 ) with
GN1 −GN0 = dGN . Because the marginal utility of wealth increases less after a temporary
rise in GN than after a permanent increase in GN , the negative impact on LN produced
by the wealth effect (which reduces CN ) is smaller. Keeping in mind that LN rises after
a permanent fiscal shock, we can infer from this that non-traded labor increases more
following a temporary fiscal shock.
Substituting LN
λ¯
< 0 and LN
GN
> 0 given by (411) into (440), the change in non-traded
labor in the short-run following a temporary fiscal shock can be rewritten as follows:
dLN (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −ωCαCσCL
N
λ¯χωN
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+
P
χ
> 0, (441)
where χ > 0 (given by (412)). Eq. (441) corresponds to eq. (22) in the text.
Differentiating (407) and inserting (441) yields:
dP
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ηµ,NηN,LN
P
LN
dLN
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0. (442)
where ηµ,N < 0 and ηN,LN > 0.
Over the unstable period, the economy decumulates traded bonds. To see it formally,
differentiate the general solution for traded bonds (431) with respect to time:
B˙(t) = r?D2er
?t < 0, (443)
where the sign is stemming from D2 < 0.
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